



# **Transformation of Informal Governance to Formal Governance: Study on Former Enclaves of Bangladesh**

**By**  
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**MPPG 5<sup>th</sup> Batch**

December 2016



**Public Policy & Governance Program**  
**North South University**



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**Public Policy & Governance Program**  
**North South University**

**Dedicated to**  
**Participants of MPPG 5<sup>th</sup> Batch**

## **Declaration**

**I declare that the dissertation entitled “Transformation of Informal Governance to Formal Governance: Study on Former Enclaves of Bangladesh” submitted to the PPG Program of North South University, Bangladesh for the Degree of Master in Public Policy and Governance (MPPG) is an original work of mine. No part of it, in any form, has been copied from other sources without acknowledgement or submitted to any other university or institute for any degree or diploma. Views and expressions of the thesis bear the responsibility of mine with the exclusion of PPG for any errors and omissions to it.**

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## **Abstract**

This study is an effort to understand the scenario of informal governance in the former enclaves and the transformation process of governance in the former enclaves after the historical exchange. It covers a wide range from social lives to political lives and land management in the former enclaves. But this study mainly concentrates on the transformation process of informal governance to formal governance in the former enclaves after the historical exchange and has identified the beneficiary groups in the former enclaves after the exchange.

The creation of a Landlocked of Archipelago had a long historical background. It came into existence in 1947. This controversial demarcation was as a result of the Partition of Bengal. Most newly independent states had kept their boundaries unchanged during the decolonization that they had during the colonial rule. But it was not the case in the sub continent. India and Pakistan had created completely new international borders between them. The enclaves were created at that time and their sufferings had started from that time.

Enclave dwellers had lot of suffering in that previous 68 years. They were denied access to their main land. They were deprived from their most basic thing of life. Cut off from the mainland and out of the ambit of state generated services, residents of these enclave dwellers were as like refugees. Because of judicial complication, government officials of both sides were not allowed to enter the enclaves. Excluded from the state administration along with no law and judicial procedure, the practice of might is right and informal governance of those enclaves was as a whole. There were no formal rule of law or any such formal mechanism seems function at all here. Dwellers lived in a worst condition with no access to the same standard of living as the majority were rightfully enjoying in a country. They were living inside a territory but they were familiar as the people of absolutely nowhere, stateless and citizen of no country.

The political game of two neighbor countries has come to an end on 1<sup>st</sup> August 2015. Now the stateless citizens are the citizens of the state. It is the government responsibility to ensure the all rights through formal mechanisms. Informal governance has shifted to formal governance with the presence of state. The interplay between informal and formal governance depend on the goals.

Depending on the situation, informal mechanism set its role. Either it is conducive or restraining. Informal governance could be substitute or competent with formal governance depend on the country context. This research has used fourfold typology of Helmke and Levitsky to know the transformation process of informal governance to formal governance. Gabdulhakov five steps model has used to identify the root causes of worst situations in the former enclaves. Location of the enclaves and absence of resources were the causes of state absenteeism. Absence of state created protection gap and influence Bangladesh to play the patron-client role in the enclaves.

This research has four research questions. Based on extensive field work, this study has opened up its research findings. Primary and secondary data have used to explore the informal and formal governance. Formalization processes have observed through primary and secondary data and a fourfold typology provided by Helmke and Levitsky have used to observe formal-informal institutional interaction. More emphasize has given on to land issues as land is very sensitive issue for the dwellers. Data from all sources have used to disclosure the land issues. Primary and secondary data along with case studies have done to find out the beneficiary groups.

# Chapter One

## Introduction

With the clock striking zero hour, the political games of two neighbor countries have come to an end. 1<sup>st</sup> august 2015 was a historical day for the dwellers of Indian and Bangladeshi enclaves. On that historical day total 54008<sup>1</sup> people became citizen of a state from the citizen of stateless. Now the word enclave and exclave are no more exist in the southern Asia<sup>2</sup>. Exchange of enclaves not only related with land and geo graphical territory but also more than that. Not only lives of two enclave dwellers have changed but also the map of two closes neighbor have changed. On that historical day, sixty eight years of suffering came to an end. One hundred eleven<sup>3</sup> exclaves<sup>4</sup> of India which was situated in the territory of Bangladesh (Known as Bangladeshi Enclave) had transferred to Bangladesh. While fifty one Bangladeshi exclaves (Known as Indian enclave) handed over to India. By this swap, the inhabitants of dwellers have come under formal governance and they are enjoying all the state amenities. Because of absence of state and formal governance, their lives as enclave dwellers had gone under hardship. Enclave dwellers lived under informal governance. After the swap, informal governance is interplaying with formal governance and it has raised a drastic question to see; how formal and informal governance are interplaying.

1. Last Joint census report of Bangladesh and India & BBS census report 2015 on enclave (Unpublished), According to survey; 39,144 people lived in Indian enclaves and 14,864 people lived in Bangladesh enclaves.
2. Enclave now history—The daily independent,1<sup>st</sup> august 2015
3. According to “District census hand book of India” of 1961, total number of enclave was 226. Among them Indian enclaves were 131 and Bangladeshi enclaves were 95. Later total number of enclaves had come down. As per the joint survey of India and Bangladesh (conducted on 21-24 November 2016), total number of enclave was 162. Among them 111 were Indian enclave and 51 were Bangladeshi enclaves.
4. Belonging state is known as exclave and State in which the land is located is known as enclave

### 1.1 Definition of enclave:

Before going to main discourse we should know what is enclave. The term enclave first pronounced in the treaty of Madrid of 1526 (Shewly, 2012). The English neology “enclave” has originated from French word. After time being enclaves turn into English word. In Bengali enclave is known as “Chhitmohal” and dwellers are known as “chhiter manush/lok”.

In 1959 Robinson provided the first geographic definition and classification of an enclave. According to G.W.S Robinson; enclave is a small portion of land which is detach from its main land and completely surrounded by another country. Parent country of an enclave which virtually claims only de jure citizenship to the residents due to birth at enclaves.

According to Robinson (1959) Classifications are as follows

- a. Normal exclave- one country’s territory completely surrounded by another;
- b. Quasi-exclave- those exclaves which for one reason or another do not in fact function as exclaves today;
- c. Pena exclave - parts of the territory of one country that can be approached conveniently, in particular by wheeled traffic-only through the territory of another country;
- d. Temporary exclave - created where what was one state has been divided by an avowedly temporary or provisional line; and
- e. Virtual exclave – areas treated as exclaves of a country but they are not an integral part of that country in strict the legal sense.

(Shewly et.al, 2012:8)

In a nutshell, enclave is a portion of territory surrounded by a larger territory or a part of a country that is surrounded by another country, or a group of people who are different from the people living in the surrounding area. So, an outlying portion of island territory of a state surrounded by homeland of a foreign state is called enclave (Yunus, 2015:21).

## 1.2 Historical emergence of enclaves:

The creation of a Landlocked of Archipelago (Schendal, 2002) had a long historical background. It came into existence in 1947. Most newly independent states had kept their boundaries unchanged during the decolonization that they had during the colonial rule. But it was not the case in the sub continent. India and Pakistan had created completely new international borders between them. The enclaves were created at that time (Schendal, 2002). The term Indian Independence movement (quiet Indian movement) had been gaining massive support and consequently the British government was finally forced to leave India in 1947 (Yunus, 2015).

This controversial demarcation was as result of the Partition of Bengal. In 1947, a Boundary Commission<sup>5</sup>, headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe<sup>6</sup>, was appointed according to the Mountbatten<sup>7</sup> Plan of 3 June 1947, to divide Bengal and the Punjab between India and Pakistan. The British were always concerned with their own interests, this perplexing boundary problems remained unresolved (Rabbani, 2005). Borders should not establish only for political reason. Cultural and social factors should take into account (Dinesh, 2014). In 1947 British violated this standard. This partition was made on “two nations theory’ (Muslim nation and non-Muslim nation) (Dinesh, 2014).

5. A Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe was formed and appointed to define the boundary of Bengal and the Punjab with the greatest speed. For the Bengal portion of the boundary Radcliffe was to be assisted by four members’ viz. Justice Bijon Kumar Mukherjee and Justice Charuchandra Biswas on behalf of the Hindu Community, and Justice Abu Saleh Mohammad Akram and Justice S.A. Rahaman on behalf of the Muslim Community (Rabbani,2005:6).
6. He had no background knowledge in Indian administration nor did he have any prior knowledge about the geo-political and socio-economic conditions of the region through which he did his surgical operation. Moreover, neither he was a political leader, nor he had any prior experience adjudicating disputes of this sort. Thus it appears that Radcliff was not in a position to confirm the geographical justification in defining the boundary. So the Boundary Commission could neither satisfy the newly created states nor the numerous people living at the borderlands (Rabbani, 2005:8).
7. The interim Indian government, formed on 24 June 1946, failed to settle the communal issues, which took violent turn day by day. Under the prevailing circumstances, in February 1947, British Prime Minister Mr. Attlee declared in the parliament that power must be transferred before 30 June 1948 and with this end in view Lord Mountbatten was appointed Viceroy and Governor General of India on 22 March 1947, Being unable to contain the worsening communal strife the scheduled time for the transfer of power was reduced from 30 June 1948 to 14 August 1947 in the June 3rd Plan of Mountbatten. Such a hurried decision caused serious practical problems to the process of partition including the demarcation of the extensive and complicated boundaries between the two emerging dominions (Rabbani, 2005:5).

As a result demarcation was completed only in six weeks. On 8<sup>th</sup> July Sir Cyril Radcliffe arrived in Delhi. He submitted the report on 13<sup>th</sup> August (Banglapedia). The boundaries drawn on a 'Topo-sheet' were made public on 16 August as a masterpiece of division of territory between two sovereign countries. The new international border between Indian and East Pakistan was drawn quickly (See foot note 7) by a boundary commission. This boundary commission had done most complicated task within a small time. They did base on district map rather than field survey (Chatterji, 1999). It should be done by field survey because scenario was different in different situation. Partition based on district map had created this complicated situation.

By the solving of one problem, another problem had introduced in this region. British government did not take any initiative to solve the land disputes between India and Pakistan. After the Independent land disputes between India and Pakistan had changed its color. From 1971 land disputes had shifted between India and Bangladesh. The history<sup>8</sup> of these enclaves goes back to pre-colonial periods when Mughals could not occupy the kingdom of Cooch Behar. However, some landlords loyal to Mughals existed in the Cooch Behar kingdom by force or by compromise and vice versa (Dinesh, 2014:21). Mughals and Cooch Behar<sup>9</sup> kingdom had along disputes over 70 years. In this cat and mouse game, landlords from both sides were able to grip their land estates within Cooch Behar kingdom and Mughal dominion inside the northern part of Bengal.

8. In pursuance of history, the formation of enclave was cause of dissipated life style of the ancient kings and rulers. Territory had often changed when the will of king-rulers would pursue something for strategic reason. They offered land pieces as gift for rulers. Viswa Singh was a powerful and influential king (during 1519) in the era of Cooch Behar Kingdom. In that era minor kingdoms were ruled by local kings and land lords. Conflicts were part of routine work (Yunus, 2015). Sometime the enclaves resulted from the profligate gambling habits of the local Maharajas (Chanda, 2006). The folk tale says that when the Maharajas would meet for a monthly night of drinking and gambling, if a Maharaja lost his money he would resort to gambling the rights to estates he owned in the area, which resulted in a patchwork of different sovereign rulers(Jones:2009:375).
9. The Cooch Bihar State, founded in the early sixteenth century soon rose to prominence in northeast India due to its geo-strategic and geo-trading importance as a buffer state between the Mughal Empire and its neighbors, the Ahom Kingdom of Brahmaputra valley and the Tibbet. (Rabbani, 2005:4)



Pockets of land captured by Cooch Behar kingdom within Mughal Empire were introduced as Rajgir<sup>10</sup>. They were loyal to king of Cooch Behar. Whereas land captured by Mughal within the Cooch Behar were introduced as Mughlam. They were loyal to the dynasty of Mughal. These geographically separated lands from the parent state were then called as enclave and Chhitmohal in Bengali (Yunus, 2015). In 1713 a treaty was signed between the Maharaja and the Mogul leaders. The treaty stated that the battle would end and controlled (by the armies) areas of each side would be taxed by the ruler (Whyte, 2002).

The arrangement had little impact on the daily lives of the residents; it only meant that some people's taxes and documents were handled in Cooch Behar while others were handled in the equally close Mogul towns of Jalpaiguri or Rangpur. When the British East India Company acquired Bengal from the Mughals in 1765, the border with Cooch Bihar marked the northern most limit of the British territory (Rabbani, 2005:4).

Eventually the British conquered the Mogul empire but left the princely state of Cooch Behar as it was (Bhattacharyya, 2000). Cooch Bihar became the first Princely State under the control of a British political agent (Rabbani, 2005:5). The boundaries between Cooch Behar and the British Empire were finally surveyed and marked in the 1930s but the enclaves were left in place because there was local resistance to any changes to the tax system (Whyte, 2002).

At the time of partition, the territory was divided into India and Pakistan, and 565 princely states having option to merge in future with either of the countries. The Princely state of Cooch Behar was merged with India two years after in September 1949<sup>11</sup>(Dinesh, 2014:21). After the partition in 1947, these pockets of land under the sovereignty of Cooch Behar contained inside the territory of East Pakistan became Indian enclaves.

10. In British era a treaty was signed between Cooch kingdom and British empire. According to the treaty the Rajgir properties which were inside the Mughal territory came to be denoted as outlying portions of Cooch Behar kingdom.

11. Until 1949 Cooch Behar kingdom was independent. Jagaddipendra Narayan Bhup Bahadur, the king of Cooch Behar, opted to the join in India. It was in the 28<sup>th</sup> august 1949(Dinesh, 2014).

Similarly, such holdings remained under sovereignty of Mughals inside the kingdom of Cooch Behar became enclaves of East Pakistan (Yunus, 2015:31). From that day all pockets of land inside and outside the main territory, which was under the sovereignty of the king of Cooch Behar and Rangpur, became enclaves (Chhitmohal). Enclaves were found only in the northern part of Bangladesh, covered by Kurigram, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari and Panchagarh. Those were formerly under the authority of the semi-independent zamindars or native chiefs of Rangpur and Dinajpur during the Mughal Empire. In the Indian side, enclaves are found only in Cooch Bihar and Jalpaiguri districts of West Bengal. This area was under the jurisdiction of the Maharaja of Cooch Bihar (Rabbani, 2006).

### **1.3 Back ground of the study:**

#### **1.3.1 Enclave's life:**

Enclave dwellers had lot of suffering in that previous 68 years. They had citizenship. But they were treated as proxy citizen (Schendel, 2002). They were denied access to their main land. Access to main land had never been regulated. For this reason they had to harass or had to pay bribes or being arrested at the time of left their enclaves. They were deprived from their most basic thing of life. Cut off from the mainland and out of the ambit of state generated services and welfare schemes, residents of these enclave dwellers were as like refugees. They were underprivileged and ungoverned. Because of judicial complication, government officials of both sides are not allowed to enter the enclaves (Jason Cons, 2013).

Enclave dwellers cannot willfully, at least not legally, travel outside the enclaves. Excluded from state administration along with no law and judicial procedure, the practice of might is right and some cases informal governance of those enclaves was as a whole (Yunus, 2015). They were such a backward citizen in terms of main land that absence of the state gave them some new way of thinking. Over 68 years enclave dwellers were unadministered. There were no formal rule of law or any such formal mechanism seems function at all here. Dwellers lived in a worst condition with no access to the same standard of living as the majority were rightfully enjoying in a country. They were living inside a territory but they

were familiar as the people of absolutely nowhere, stateless and citizen of no country. They had the only realization that they are the people of enclave (locally known as 'Chhiter manus/lok'). Government did not recognize them as their own citizens. In order to fulfill their needs relied on unlawful thing. Life of these enclave dwellers, thereof, without any right as lawful citizens was absolutely of frustrating. Denied of basic amenities from the difficulty of practical problems of access to their home country, the inhabitants living in the Bangladeshi exclaves inside India were compelled to enter the area of India for their needs. It was also vice versa for residents of India within main part of Bangladesh (Yunus, 2015).

In order to admit in School enclave dwellers used fake address. In order to admit they had to hunt for borrowed father and mother for official purpose (Yunus, 2015). It was also the same case for admitting in hospital. A pregnant woman needed fake husband to admit in hospital (Yunus, 2015). Prior to the year of 1952, the people of enclaves had the rights to choose any school either in India or Bangladesh. They could admit in hospital or they had opportunity to go any purpose in both India and Bangladesh. After 1952 Visa Passport system came to front. From that time they become landlocked and they engaged in illegal activities (Yunus, 2015)

Agriculture was the main occupation to enclave. But they were often denied access outside the enclaves. Economically and socially, the enclaves remain integrated with the surrounding state and the currency of the state was used (Schendel, 2002:129). As we have seen, the state to which the enclaves belonged had a weak and intermittent presence (Schendel, 2002:128). There was no uniformity in land registration system because enclave dwellers had no access to the main territory. Land registration became a local affair, completed with local registration forms (Schendel, 2002). Until August 1947, there had been nothing to distinguish the residents of the future enclaves from their neighbors except that they went to different local offices to pay land tax or to report a crime (Schendel, 2002:131-132). Without a state how stateless people survived for sixty eight years.

In order to survive either they went for illegal way or they introduced informal way. Their residents face difficulty in actualizing rights as citizens of their "home" state and in acquiring

legal and other official forms of protection from their bounding ones. As such, they are vulnerable to communal violence, crime, and disputes over land and property with residents of their bounding states. For example, in a recent property dispute that escalated to an alleged murder, an Indian enclave in Bangladesh was raised and burnt by residents of surrounding areas (BDNews24.com, 2010). The shared experience of fear and lowness made them united and they also tried to solve this problem by informal way of thinking (Yunus, 2015)

In some cases an enclave council was set up that drew its inspiration from the informal village councils of the region. Thus in the contiguous Indian enclaves of Dohala Khagrabari, Barpara Khagrabari and Kotabhajni (which together form the largest Indian territory within Bangladesh). Three elected *Chhitmohal Nagorik Shomiti* (Enclave Citizens' Committees) were formed, consisting of chairman and members representing different village neighborhoods. This council acted as courts, organized public works and negotiated on behalf of the enclave with the outside world. Some enclaves had informal village leaders (Schendel, 2002: 133).

*Chit* Council deals with the overall social affairs of the enclave with an approach of social cooperation. They take initiatives to resolve the disputes among the enclave dwellers through *shalish* (social arbitration). The *Chit* Council issues the land registration deeds, which have no legal value in either of the countries. The *Chit* Council has no recognition of or relation with any government. (Rabbani, 2005:46, 47).

### **1.3.2 Post enclave's life:**

From 1<sup>st</sup> August 2015 there is no existence of enclaves in Bangladesh. Now stateless people are the people of a state. They have achieved their real citizenship and identity. After the swap, enclave dwellers are now under formal governance. They were deprived for 68 years. Native state never fulfills their basic amenities. They were relying upon illegal and informal mechanisms. Now every illegal and informal thing has to legalize and formalize.

Government of Bangladesh has to face challenges to ensure all the citizen rights. They were deprived from all the fundamental needs. Their living standards were below the average living standard of Bangladeshi inhabitants. It is government responsibility to ensure all the fundamental needs. During formalize and legalize from informal and illegal things government has to face challenges. Someone has felt satisfaction and someone has felt dissatisfaction.

#### **1.4 Statement of the problem:**

After the swap, stateless people have become people of a state. While they were stateless they had to depend on illegal activities and informal governance was their beacon of lives. No state can survive without governance. According to Aristotle; “citizen as one capable of ruling and being ruled in turn”. That’s why either informal or formal governance is necessary for a state. Before the swap, in order to survive enclave dwellers had introduced illegal and informal mechanisms. So, in order to see the formalization process dwellers former lives and their informal governance system is very important. After the swap, enclave dwellers are under formal governance. Now informal governance has changed its course by formal governance. By this modification of governance; someone has felt either satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Especially for land has become a sensitive issue in the enclaves.

Conflicts are now coming in the front. After passing a single day (2<sup>nd</sup> August 2016) of historical exchange we observed a clash between two sides in *Dashia Chara*, Kurigram (Bulbul, 2015). After the historical exchange enclave dwellers become worried over their land (bdnews24.com, 18<sup>th</sup> may 2015). The India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement, when implemented, does promise a national identity for the residents of the enclaves up for swap, but they are worried over their lands. From the august 1947 there was no uniformity in the land registration. Enclave dwellers had not any contact with the native (Indian) state. In Garati, land registration became a local affair (Yunus, 2015: 129). Informal way of land registration was the solution on that area. It had no legality. It was only valid in that tiny Garati enclave without any legal standing.

*Dahia chara* is another example. It is located in Kurigram district of Bangladesh. It was one of the biggest enclaves among one hundred and eleven (111) enclaves. After 16<sup>th</sup> December 1971, enclave dwellers of this area had done their land their registration through Dinhatia land registration office by illegal movement. This office was located in Cooch Bihar of India. It was done up to the year 2005. After that enclave dwellers were not able to move to their main land. It was happened because of fencing in border and restriction by BSF. From that time land registration process was stopped (Bulbul, 2015).

It was a common scenario for all of the enclaves. As a result they had introduced some informal way of Land registration as alternative. They exchanged their land by using stamp and bond. Sometimes the big gun had made some change on bond and stamp for manipulating the amount of land. It had created lot of conflicts in past.

Now it is the big question for the government to solve the problem. How the government legalize the informal way to a formal way. Land disputes are now a great concern for the new territory (formal enclaves) of Bangladesh. There was an anarchy situation for the past sixty eight years. It was a common scenario for all of the enclaves. Until august 1947, there had been nothing to distinguish between the residents of the enclaves and their neighbors.

After the partition enclave dwellers began to feel that they are different from their neighbors. From that time different problem had raised. After that they had introduced some informal way of land registration as alternative. The *Chit* Council issues the land registration deeds, which have no legal value in either of the countries. Thereby the buyers of land in the enclaves could not have any legal document in support of their ownership. Hence the price of the enclave lands several times lower than that in the surrounding areas (Rabbani, 2005:47). It was until the historical exchange of enclaves.

“If you do not pay taxes regularly, you lose ownership of the land. We paid taxes regularly. After the Bangladesh’s liberation, my uncle was going to pay taxes. But he was detained by the BSF at the border and sent to prison. (bdnews24.com, 18<sup>th</sup> may 2015).” After the historical exchange disputes are arising over the land issue. After passing a single day (2<sup>nd</sup>

August 2016) of historical exchange we observed a clash between two sides in *Dashia Chara*, Kurigram (Bulbul, 2015). Government has to work to formalize the whole informal procedure. Land is a very sensitive thing. After the fall of British colony there is no land survey in the formal enclaves. So in order to formalize the informal institutes and illegal activities, government has to face big challenges.

### **1.5 Objective of the research:**

#### **1.5.1 General objectives:**

Objectives of this research are to explore the processes of formalization after the historical swap. This research wants to find out the challenges and mechanisms that government is facing to formalize the informal governance in former enclaves especially on land issues. This research paper wants to find out their former livelihood and informal mechanism that they had introduced in their former enclave lives. This research also wants to find out the beneficiary groups after the historical exchange.

#### **1.5.2 Specific objective:**

To see what is the nature of informal governance when it intermingles with political structure in Bangladesh?

### **1.6 Research questions:**

1. What were the features of informal governance in enclaves?
2. How informal governance is changing its socio-political nature when it comes close to the formal governance?
3. How formal governance is solving the land issues?
4. Who are the beneficiaries after this swap?

### **1.7 Distribution of chapters:**

This paper has been presented with six distinguished chapters. The outline of the chapters is as follows-

- a.** Chapter 1 is the introductory part and has discussed background, objectives, significance and research questions etc.
- b.** Chapter 2 relevant literatures have been reviewed in order to attain current knowledge including substantive findings, as well as to know their theoretical and methodological contributions in the area of present study.
- c.** Chapter 3 focuses on details methodology for the current study.
- d.** Chapter 4 focuses on results and discussions of the research questions.
- e.** Chapter 5 has analyzed the research findings based on theoretical concept.
- f.** Chapter 6 provides major conclusions and has drawn important remarks from the study.



## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review**

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss relevant literatures and find out the research gaps. Aim of the literature review is to find out how an unrealistic partition or land politics had created impact on livelihood of former enclave dwellers. How their social and economical lives were influenced by informal institution. Aim of literature review also find out the dilemma of formal and informal governance and how they can inter play with each other.

This literature review has started by paying attention to the previous research. This research paper has tried to find out the research gap of previous research. Then this paper has followed by livelihood, social systems, importance of land and land system, beneficiary group (based on patron client relationship) in former enclaves. This paper has also reviewed governance, informal governance and its existence in former enclaves.

#### **2.1 Research gap:**

Lamb (1968), Karan (1966), Presscott (1975), and Whyte (2002) did research. But all are in geographical aspect. No one so much concern about the political and socio-economic aspects. They treated the issue as a geographical curiosity or as a problem of state sovereignty and international law. But they were not so much concerned about the social and political life. They were not even concerned about their identities. They were not concerned, why they were involved in illegal activities and what made them criminal.

Whyte (2002) suggested developing tourist industry around the enclaves. He also suggested retaining the enclave rather than exchange and merging. But more important thing is that at least Whyte (2002) observed the whole scenario of enclave. He revealed the immense suffering and inhuman effort of enclave dwellers for survive. Willem Van Schendel (2002), an historian and anthropologist, put his attention on the state of Bangladesh-India enclaves

in the perspective of statehood vis a individual livelihood. Will, gift and lifestyle of the ancient king had created enclaves. Marriage and strategy were other reasons to create enclaves. Creation enclave was the causes of conflict among the king and ruler. As there was no international boundary, it was not problematic but after the unrealistic partition and later mistrust made the situation complex. And it was the serious issue for the many decades (Dinesh, 2014).

“Enclave dwellers got little attention by the researcher. The literatures hardly reveal the political and socio-economic aspects of the individuals thereof “(Rabbani, 2005:8).

## **2.2 Livelihood of former enclave dwellers:**

After getting the independent enclave dwellers faced more difficulties to survive. New national identities and border controls made the life of enclave more vulnerable (Rabbani, 2005) (Dinesh, 2014). According to Schendel (2002), Rabbani (2005), Yunus (2015) People of the enclaves had floated identity. They were neither the citizen of India nor the citizen of Bangladesh. Lives of enclave dwellers were inhuman. They were deprived from their basic needs. State was unable to provide their basic needs which were like health, sanitation, education and so on. To avail these basic services from the state enclosing the enclaves, they had to cross the sovereign borders many times a day illegally (Dinesh, 2014). Thus, Schendel (2002) has observed that criminalized were the daily routines for the enclave dwellers without offering them any alternatives.

Violence, crimes, rape and murder were the daily incident. There were no formal mechanisms to control those incidents. Enclave dwellers were excluded from state judicial systems. Developing works such as roads and electrical supply would end at the boundaries of the enclaves. Fences and check to prevent irregular movement affected enclave dwellers' mobility. It became necessary for residents to illegally enter the surrounding country to fulfill basic needs and for their economic survival (to access local shops to buy and sell goods, for instance), often becoming victims of sovereignty mechanisms and subject to prosecution as illegal intruders. More than 75 percent of the residents of Bangladeshi

enclaves in India have spent time in prison after being arrested for entering India without valid travel documents Schendel (2002), Rabbani (2005), Yunus (2015). Amid all the adversities due to the absence of the state, enclave people had soldiered on. Though they had not been able to do anything about the lack of healthcare facilities, they had made ad-hoc arrangements for their education (P.Bhattacharjee, 2015). The main feature of the enclave was composition of backward livelihood, social exclusion, economic vulnerability and vulnerable infrastructure facilities (Rabbani, 2005).

Creation of zigzag border between India and Bangladesh had created disputes between two neighbors. In the enclave existence area's border are more zigzag than any other area. This zigzag land made the land more complicated. This land politics made the enclave dwellers criminalized to do their daily routine and customary transactions (Rabbani, 2005). Rabbani (2005) also revealed (i) the statelessness and the crisis of identity in the enclaves (ii) survival strategy of the enclave people and (iii) the prevailing social order that has evolved as an alternative to state administration.

The partition with artificial boundary through the densely populated agrarian area had found to be a disaster for the people, entailing a serious socio-economic impact at the micro level. Remarkably the enclave people had mostly victimized by the partition. But their grievance could not draw even minimum attention either from the governments of the respective countries or from the social workers and civil societies during the long period of almost six decades (Rabbani, 2005).

Identity and cultural change have impact on both formal and informal institution. According to Ostrom (2005) "it is impossible to address the norms attitudes and values in the context of institutions without addressing issues of culture and history."

### **2.3 Social system of former enclaves:**

Be cut off from the main land, enclave dwellers became dependent on their personal relations (social capital) with the neighboring people. The boundary could make little

difference between the enclave dwellers. Though there was no formal administration in the enclave. So enclave dwellers had to suffer. The proverb Might is right was true there. By and large the enclave dwellers were on good terms with the surrounding alien community. They had interactions with them. Marriage was an important way to link with surrounding community but guardian had feared to give marriage to the dwellers.

They felt safe when they had some strong relatives over there. Muslims had to suffer to register the marriage. They had to use fake address to register the marriage. Some of them also were disagree to marriage with enclave dwellers (Rabbani, 2005).

#### **2.4 Land system in the former enclaves:**

Land pattern was in diverse manner because of its circumstances of their emergence. Some time was shifted by gift. Absence of the owner of the land and any government, big fish of the surrounding country had occupied a large chunk of *chit* land. They still lived in their country but enjoy the ownership of land in the enclave. In this illegal occupied land they handed over to *Adhjar*. The landowners called them as *proja* and take pride as landlords. Informal mechanism was the way for Purchase and selling of land. However, some lands were purchased by non-judicial stamps of registration in support of their purchased ownership, which were registered, in the Indian Land Registry Office in Haldibari (Cooch Bihar) Rabbani (2005), Dinesh (2014), and Yunus (2015).

#### **2.5 Beneficiary group:**

If we observe the history of enclave what we see. We see that patron client relationship was the basic of all. They mostly try to make nuptial matches in the surrounding community of the host country. They feel safe to some extent when they have some strong relatives over there. But many times they fail to do so (Rabbani, 2005). Power structure have significant role in transformation. Inefficient institutes may exist depends on power structures, political economy (Stiglitz et al., 2001 cited Johannes et al., 2007). According to Ostrom (2005) Groups with power benefits may need high cost to change the institution.

## **2.6 Governance:**

Governance has different meanings in corporate, politics, international relations. Governance is applied in different concept in different meaning (Kjaer, 2004). Governance is a tool to solve the problems of various aspects. Governance generally refers to questions about forms of power and authority, patterns of relationship and rights and obligations among the people facing common problems (Newman, 2001). According to Karl Polanyi social relation has impact on informal institution.

## **2.7 Informal and formal governance:**

Personal intimacy is the key to informal governance and is the harbinger for the formal governance. The interplay between informal and formal governance depend on the goals. Depending on the situation, informal mechanism set its role. Either it is conducive or restraining. Informal governance is not codified. Informal institutions are based on trust, solidarity and social capital such as tradition and customs, family relationship and structure, social and civil norms. Informal governance could be substitute or competent with formal governance depend on the country context (Boesen, 2006).

Olowu and Erero (1995) made the difference between formal and informal structures or institutions. Formal governance is the outcome of modern state, while Informal governance is people's everyday lives and the social, economic and political interaction between them. It is not codified. Patron client relationships have significant effect on informal governance. According to Levitsky & Helmke, 2004 there are some reasons for developing informal institutions. First Informal institutions have created because of incomplete formal institutions. Second, informal institutions may be an alternative strategy for actors who prefer, but cannot achieve, a formal institutional solution.

Informal institutes may create when the formal institutes are most costly than informal institutions. Informal governance has four aspects i.e. Complementary, Substitutive, Accommodating and Competing. Complimentary informal institutions are used to fill the limitation of formal institutions. It enhances the efficiency of the formal rules or institution

otherwise formal rules might exist merely on paper. Ineffective formal institutions, exist on paper, may create Substitutive informal institutions. In the case of substitutive informal institutions, those types of institute create because of lack of credibility. It does not create because of dislikes of formal rules.

*Accommodating* informal institutions alter the *substantive effects* of formal rules, but without directly violating them. Accommodating informal institutions are often created by actors who dislike outcomes generated by the formal rules. It may not enhance the efficiency but enhance the stability of formal institutions. When actors have to follow one law other must be violated by actors. In these case competing informal institutions are exist. Competing informal institutions exist when incompatible with the formal rules. Particularistic informal institutions such as clientelism, patrimonialism, clan politics, and corruption are among the most familiar. In these cases, formal rules and procedures are not systematically enforced, which enables actors to ignore or violate them.

## **2.8 Informal governance in enclaves:**

Enclave dwellers did not have any scope to gather and to organize themselves with the purpose of pursuing their rights and objectives. Some individuals of the Indian enclaves formed the *Chhitmohal Nagorik Committee* (Enclave People Committee). It is pertinent to note that the objective of the Committee was to lodge complains to the governments and to procure their rights and privileges as it was mentioned in the bulletin of the meeting. However, they could not advance their movement due to the lack of proper organization and support from the political parties.

Consequently *chit* committee or council came into existence in some of the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh. The *chit* committee used to provide them with certificate of citizenship of Indian enclave and then they could enter into India by showing the certificate in the border checkpoint. But that facility was cancelled in 1997 by the government of India on the allegation that the *Chit* Councils had issued some false certificates to the Bangladeshi citizens, certifying them as the citizen of Indian enclave. This Council is, in fact, one kind of

social administration. The *Chit* Council deals with the overall social affairs of the enclave with an approach of social cooperation. They took initiatives to resolve the disputes among the enclave dwellers through *shalish* (social arbitration) Schendel (2002), Rabbani (2005), Dinesh (2014). Patron-client relationship was the common practice for social arbitration. Bangladeshi political masters acted as a patron. If any dwellers did not carry the patron's order he had to harass.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Research Methodology**

This chapter gives the detailed outline of the research. This chapter illustrates an overview of the methodology and procedures applied in this study. This chapter deals with the processes that were applied to explore the enclave dweller's past and present lives. This chapter also deals with the process to explore the informal and formal governance of the enclaves. This study also explores the interplay between the formal and informal governance and have identified the beneficiary groups.

The main objective of this research is to see the informal and formal mechanisms in the enclaves and their processes of transformation. This research has not focused on historical emergence of enclaves and land swap deals. That's why this research gives little attention on those issues rather than gives more attention on transformation.

#### **3.1 Research Design:**

This work is an exploratory research and has focused to explore the ins and outs of the enclave dwellers before and after the swap. Research has designed to see how enclave dwellers were lived under the informal governance before the land swap deal and how enclave dwellers livelihood has changed after the historical swap. Aim of the research design is to explore the transformation process of governance from informal to formal in the former enclaves.

This research is designed to explore how informal governance is changing when it is mixing with formal governance, after the exchange. It also focuses to see how formal governance has solved most complicated land disputes in the former enclaves. This research has also designed to identify the beneficiary groups by analyzing research questions and doing case



study. Both primary and secondary data have used to complete the research. Secondary data have mainly used to explore the previous livelihood and informal mechanisms before the swap. Primary data have used mainly to see the transformation processes and formal livelihood. Primary and secondary data have used to explore the land related issues. Both primary and secondary data have used to identify the beneficiary groups.

### **3.2 Research Methodology:**

Based on research objectives, variable and research questions, researcher select its method. In social research, combination of various methods is necessary to achieve the desired level rather than single method. Using a single method is not enough for a research (Aminuzzaman, 1991). This is a qualitative type exploratory research. Several methods have used to achieve the desired research goal. Methods have selected; to fulfill the research objectives and to analyze and answers the research questions.

In this research several methods like in-depth interview with semi-structured questionnaire, focus group discussion, case study and content analysis methods have been used. Content analysis is the source of secondary data.

### **3.3 Data Collection Methods and Respondents:**

The following methods and sample have used to achieve the desired goals. Both primary and secondary data have collected through the various methods as one single method is not sufficient for conducting a research.

#### **3.3.1 Content Analysis:**

Secondary data have collected by content analysis. Different types of books, relevant articles and previous research have reviewed to collect the secondary data. Various official websites and daily papers are also the source of secondary data. This research has a link with history, so various historical documents are the source of secondary data. These documents are used mainly to understand the previous livelihood and informal mechanisms

of the former enclave dwellers. Historical documents also have played a crucial role to understand the root cause of enclave. Historical documents have helped to know the underneath meaning of the enclaves.

### **3.3.2 Interviews:**

Sixty peoples have interviewed to collect the primary data. Relevant information was collected from the enclave dwellers, ex-chit chairmen and members of former enclaves, inhabitants outside the enclaves, UNO, Agriculture officers, bloc supervisors. These interviews were of informal nature though an interview guide was prepared for the purpose. These interviews have helped the researcher to know the formal and informal lives and governance mechanism of the former enclaves. It also helps to explore the transformation processes from informal to formal governance

### **3.3.3 Focus Group Discussion:**

Two focus groups discussions have arranged; consisted of 10 individuals in each focus group discussion. FGD (Focus Group discussion) was held in the *Garati* and *Behuladanga* enclave. Discussant shared their present and past livelihood and condition of the enclaves. Discussant also shared their views regarding transformation processes which are going on in the former enclaves. In order to capture as much information as possible, each of these events were tape-recorded; photographs and notes were taken by the researcher with the permission from the participants. Discussants were selected from various communities like peasants, shopkeepers, women, ex. member/chairman, religious leader etc.

### **3.3.4 Case Study:**

Case study in this research has played a vital role to identify the beneficiary groups. Three case studies have done and cases have selected from different nature. To select three dwellers, patron-client relationship have played vital role. One ex-chit chairman from *Putimari* has selected as a case study. Two dwellers from *Garati* and *Shalbari* have selected for the case study. *Ex-chit* chairman was the patron of the enclaves and dwellers were the client and loyal to the patron.

### **3.4 Unit of analysis:**

Former enclaves and its dwellers is unit of analysis of this study. Officials of Indian and Bangladeshi had done a joint survey to identify the enclaves in November 1996. According to this report 111 Indian enclaves were in the Bangladeshi territory and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves were in the Indian territories. This study has taken four enclaves; *Garati*, *Behuladanga*, *Shalbari* and *Putimari* among one hundred eleven former Indian enclaves inside the Bangladesh territory.

#### **3.4.1 Regions behind the selection:**

There were two criteria to select the enclaves one was based on location and other was based on informal governance systems. *Putimari* and *Shalbari* enclaves have selected base on location. *Garati*, *Behuladanga* enclaves have selected base on informal governance.

Former *Putimari* enclave was adjacent to Bangladeshi territory (India), was located beside the main highway of Panchagarh districts but belong to other country. Though it was very close to the Bangladeshi land but did not belong to Bangladesh. *Shalbari* enclave was located in the remote area of Bangladesh but belong to India.

*Garati*, *Behuladanga*, *Shalbari* enclaves had strong informal governance systems. *Garati* enclave has a significance to achieve the freedom. It was one of the biggest enclaves among 111 enclaves. It was a center point for enclave's exchange movement. By centering an incident in this enclave, all the enclave dwellers were more united than previous times to free from the prisoner lives. Informal mechanisms were more united than other enclaves but there was no direct voting system to make informal institute.

*Behuladanga* had strong informal governance system. Among 111 enclaves only *Behuladanga* and *Shalbari* jointly introduced direct voting system among the dwellers to select their chairman and members.

### 3.5 Distinct features of selected enclaves:

Location of these enclaves was different but their livelihood, norms, and values, economical lives, social lives, governance system were similar to each other. Their locations were different but their miseries were unique. Their ill fate had not changed by the geographical location and influence.

#### 3.5.1 Location and population of enclaves:

**Garati** enclave (former) is located at the *Hapijabad* and *Haribasa* union under the Sadar Upazila in *Panchagarh* district. It is 5 km away from the Indian border. Its chit no was 78.

**Population:** As per last joint census report by two countries total population in the former enclave is 1,689. Among them male is 882 and female is 807. Four persons including two male and two female migrated to India and rest 1,685 people have chosen Bangladesh .

**Shalbari** enclave (former) is located at the *Mareya* union under *Boda* Upazila in *Panchagarh* district. It is 11 Km away from the Indian border. Its chit no was 37.

**Population:** As per last joint census report by two countries total population in the former enclave is 1,350. Among them male and female is in equal 675. No one migrated from this enclave. All population has chosen Bangladesh as their main land. Most of the populations were migrated from *Haldibari* of *Cooch Behar*, *jalpiguri* and *Gohati* of *Assam* of India (Yunus, 2015).

**Behuladanga** enclave (former) is located at the *Dashalbanga* and *Teprigonj* union under the *Debigong* Upazila in *Panchagarh* district. It is 12.50 km away from the India, chit no was 34.

**Population:** As per last joint census report by two countries total population in the former enclave is 1,931. Among them male is 996 and female is 935. Seven persons including four male and three female migrated to India and rest 1,924 people have chosen Bangladesh.

**Putimari** enclave (former) is located at the *Maydandigi* union under the *Boda* Upazila in *Panchagarh* district. It is 15 km away from the Indian border. Its chit no was 59.

**Population:** As per last joint census report by two countries total population in the former enclave is 388. Among them male is 197 and female is 191. No one migrated from this enclave. All population has chosen Bangladesh as their main land.

### **3.5.2 Demographic features:**

People who are living in the former enclaves have come from three distinct demographic features. Firstly, inhabitants in the former enclaves are living from the partition, in 1947, Hindus and Muslims from both ends either sold or exchanged their properties. Secondly, During the Hindu-Muslim riot in 1956, both Hindus and Muslims exchanged or sold their ancestral possessions and came in the enclaves through swapping their ancestral possessions. Thirdly, a significant number of people have migrated from the Bangladesh main territory to the enclaves. They are known as Bhatiya. They mostly came from the northern part of Bangladesh after the independent. Mainly from Jamalpur, Sherpur, Tangail, Mymensingh, Gaibandha, Narsingdi and Rangpur districts of Bangladesh.

### **3.5.3 Economical features:**

Agriculture and daily labor was their main economical activities. Most of the inhabitants were relied upon agriculture. They sold their agricultural products to the adjacent Bangladeshi market. Inhabitants also purchased their products from the Bangladeshi market. As they were the citizen of India, many of them never seen Indian currency. Bangladesh currency was used in the former enclaves. Because of unavailability of a agricultural support, they were engage in basic crops cultivation such as paddy, jute, vegetables

This research has explored the informal and formal mechanisms of formal enclaves. This research has focused from administration to livelihood, religious to education, land management to social management in every aspect. This research has discussed it in collaborative way in later chapters.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Results and discussion**

This chapter deals with results discussions. This research has four research questions. Based on extensive field work, this study has opened up its research findings. Primary and secondary data have used to explore the informal and formal governance. Formalization processes have observed through primary and secondary data. More emphasize has given on to land issues as land is very sensitive issue for the dwellers. Data from all sources have used to disclosure the land issues. Primary and secondary data along with case studies have done to find out the beneficiary groups.

#### **4.1 Features of informal governance**

This research has identified the features of informal governance in the former enclaves. This section deals with two things; firstly recapitulates theoretical discussions followed by features of informal governance in the former Bangladeshi enclaves. This work has identified the dwellers antecedent existence and their subsistence in the enclaves. It has unfolded the governance system in the former enclaves.

The concept of patron-clientelism is an important agenda for anthropology where as informal governance is the key object for anthropological study (Helmke et al., 2003). Patron-clientelism is an important conceptual framework for the study of politics for both developing and developed countries (Islam, 2006). Patron-clientelism means a relationship where patron ensures benefit and protection for his client or weaker person in lieu of loyalty, service and support. Instead of economic and other benefits client acted as an illegal vote bank for the patron.

Absence of state creates an environment to formulate the informal mechanisms (Plogeer, 2010). Absence of state create protection gap as result informal governance gets a platform

to flourish over there. Absence of native state also gives a window for other state to dominate over there. As India give the window to dominate their land by Bangladesh. Absence of government created this type of opportunity to rule the other state.

#### **4.1.1 Proxy citizenship:**

Citizenship is at the center of political philosophy from the beginning (Dumbrava, 2012). Citizenship obtained via a birth is the accepted practice in this world. A newborn baby automatically acquired citizenship. A person who has no citizenship faces limited access to state protection and services (Belton, 2005). Citizenship has three main features. (1) A formal status that link individuals to a state and is attached to a bundle of rights and duties. (2) Participation in the political community. (3) A collective identity that is shared by individuals holding the same status (Carens, 2000 cited Dumbrava, 2012). It is the state's duty to ensure the above features to the citizen whether he or she lives inside or outside the state (Dumbrava, 2012).

Former enclave dwellers of Bangladesh were the citizen of India but their native land had not taken any initiatives to ensure their citizen rights. It was vice versa for Bangladeshi citizen inside the Indian enclaves. Enclave inhabitants were detached from their main land. They had proxy citizenship and it had no meanings because in order to enjoy citizenship state should full fill some characteristics such as free movement, participation in political and social institutions, enjoy legal status (social, political, civil and religious rights) and those have to ensure by host country. Enclave dwellers were deprived from all the basic characteristics of citizenship such as social, political, civil and religious rights. Enclave dwellers sentenced to prison in order to enter their homeland (India). They were such ill fated that their homeland's security forces nabbed the dwellers to enter their own country.

“Though we were citizen of India but we didn't enjoy citizen rights from India. If we went to India, we had to face imprisonment. Even Bangladesh's government did not do anything for us. Though Bangladeshi government did not do anything for us but we are grateful to this country. We were survived

by Bangladesh through illegal activities”- Said Babul an former enclave dweller of *Shalbari*

Enclave dwellers were got limited access to enter the Indian territories by showing an identity card. This card had issued by the chairman of the *Nagorik* committee (Figure-1). Because of make shift use of this card BSF had denied enclave dwellers to enter in the Indian territories from the year 1996. They were the citizen of India and their homeland’s security agency prevented them to enter in their homeland. It means they had no citizenship rather than proxy citizenship.



Figure-1: Identity card issued by *Chit* chairman to pass the border. Source: Collected from *Shalbari* enclave

#### 4.1.2 Dual citizenship for existence:

Citizenship comprises both a form of association and a vehicle for individual identity (Spiro, 2010:1). Enclave dwellers were deprived from both association and individual identity. Enclave dwellers were deprived from their citizen rights. Identity less enclave dwellers always looked for an identity to ensure their rights. Be a legal or illegal citizen of Bangladesh was the best alternative for them.

Those who had the dual citizenship were the mighty person of the enclaves and they formed the relation with Bangladeshi mighty persons. Twofold citizenship made them



stronger to regime the enclaves. Patron-client relation had established as an outcome of twofold citizenship. Inside the enclaves patron was dual citizenship holder and client was the hapless dwellers. Outside the enclave patron was the Bangladeshi mighty (political leaders) persons and dual citizenship astringent person of the enclave was the client

#### **4.1.2.1 Path for dual identity:**

Absence of their homeland made the dwellers subservient to the Bangladesh and it was an illegal dependency. This illegal dependency forced the dwellers to establish social relation. Enclave dwellers made nuptial relation with the Bangladeshi citizen and be the Bangladeshi citizen. Most of the cases Bangladeshi inhabitants; especially daughter's guardian; had denied this type of marriage with the dwellers as there was no rule of law. If his/her daughter faces any problem, administrative personnel were not allowed to enter the enclave. That's why guardian discouraged this type of marriages. Most of the cases dwellers used their fake identity by hiding their dweller's identity. Some cases enclave dwellers had huge property in the enclave and Bangladeshi got married with him/her. Some cases Bangladeshi citizen wanted to rule the enclave and got married with dweller. Bangladeshi citizen, Feroza khatun, wife of an enclave dweller said-

“At the time of our marriage I along with my family did not know the real identity of my husband. We knew him as a Bangladeshi citizen because he had a house in the Panchagarh district. After our marriage he wanted to take me in the *Garati* enclave because his parents stayed in the enclave. By hearing this I along with my family became scared. After six months of my marriage I went there. Thanks to Almighty, I did not face any bad situation as they were good man but a girl were killed in this enclave after my marriage”

Another way to be a citizen of Bangladesh for the dwellers were purchased some land in the Bangladeshi territory and by staying over there become a citizen of Bangladesh. Eventually they enlisted his/her name as Bangladeshi.

#### **4.1.3 Monstrous Crime and violence; safe haven for criminals:**

Unequal urban society and insufficient services by the public sector may enhance crimes (Ploger, 2010). Insufficient service provision by the state, create protection gap as a result crime increase (Joseph, 2004 cited Ploger, 2010). Security initiatives for a territory by a state depend on its location and socio-economic status. Centrally located and consolidated areas get more security where as peripheral areas remain under- protected (Pereyra, 2003).

Enclave dwellers were lived in stateless limbo and they were deprived from all the state provided services such as food, clothing, health, education, justice etc. As a result enclave dwellers were administrative over the years while no rule of law was functioning at all. Insufficient service provision by the state; created protection gap in the enclaves; enhanced criminal activities as a result it was felonious place. It was the miscreant zone for criminals; crimes were the regular incidents where no offender got punishment for their crimes. After committing the crime outside the enclaves, they escaped in the enclave. Penalized perpetrator made the enclaves as their felonious zone because of absence of law and forces agencies of native state and surrounding state.

Security initiatives by a state depend on territorial location and socio economic status. Centrally located and consolidated areas get more security where as peripheral areas remain under- protected. Socio economic status was not good in the enclaves and there had no natural resources. Enclaves were surrounded by another state. That's why native state gave no attention over there. It became a safe haven for the offender and was known to all law and forces agencies. Law and forces agencies were not allowed in the enclave because of judicial and administrative complications. Enclave dwellers were bound to give them shelter. If anyone denied giving them shelter, he/she might be harassed. Because they had a strong relation with the political parties of Bangladesh or they had a strong patron client relation with the political leadership inside the Bangladeshi territory. Criminals along with enclave dwellers were involved in illegal narcotics business.

Stuck on the wrong side of border, it was impossible for government personnel to enter the enclaves to rule or made justice at least legally, and therefore, criminals in these enclaves,

gotten rid off from any kind of punishment for decades, even, they cannot file a complaint against criminals since the creation of enclaves. A significant number of innocent enclave dwellers were killed for the absence of judiciary forces. Unfortunately there is no data regarding this issue for period of sixty eight years.

In terms of killing intensity, *Garati* enclave inside Panchagarh district of Bangladesh was the first. More than thirty people had died in *Garati* over the whole periods. A murder happened in *Garati* in 2010 that was a Bangladeshi name as Ramzan ali. He along with some Bangladesh came to *Garati* to grab the land. Enclave dwellers heard this news and killed him by mass beating. For this incidents Bangladeshi citizens outside the enclave torched hundred of houses in enclaves and this turmoil was continuous for a week. During this incidents law forces agencies did nothing because of judicial complications while this incidents along with introducing NID card by Bangladeshi care taker government made them aggressive to create pressure to the Bangladesh and India government to solve the disputes.

#### **4.1.4 Introducing; Informal governance to fill the political vacuum:**

Neither of the India and Bangladesh could make any effort to ensure justice because of judicial complication. Every day, the enclave dwellers are fated to be the worst victims of systematic violation of fundamental human rights. No human rights watchdog could play any role to uphold rights of those ill-fated enclave people. As a result they had introduced informal governance to solve their problems. Social disputes were controlled and judged by the informal governance through arbitrary system which is known as *Salaish*.

##### **4.1.4.1 Structure of informal governance in the enclave:**

Structure of informal governance was alike *Union Parishad* of Bangladesh. It was known as *Chhitmohal* (Enclave) *Nagorik* (Citizen) *committee* headed by a chairman along with nine members. Tenure of this committee was five years. Women were not allowed in the committee. Women's had no voting power. All the chairman and members of *Chhitmohal* (Enclave) *Nagorik* (Citizen) *committees* were selected except *Shalbari-Behuladanga-*

*Kajoldigi-Natoktoka Chhitmohal* (Enclave) *Nagorik* (Citizen) *committee*. They had elected their chairman and members through direct election system and women had no voting power and no authority to participate in the election.

#### **4.1.4.2 Election through caretaker government and influence of Bangladesh over there:**

*Shalbari-Behuladanga-Kajoldigi-Natoktoka Chhitmohal* (Enclave) *Nagorik* (Citizen) *Committee* had introduced caretaker government was similar to Bangladesh's previous caretaker government system. After finishing five year tenure of regime they handed over the authority to the caretaker government. Caretaker government appointed an election commissioner to conduct the election. Caretaker government within one month organized an election and transferred the power to the elected chairman.

Bangladesh had vital role over this election. Head of the caretaker government and election commissioner were Bangladeshi citizen and they had the relation with the political parties of Bangladesh. Most of the chairmen and members had dual citizenship and established bridge between patron and client inside and outside the enclave.

#### **4.1.5 Role of informal governance in enclaves:**

##### **4.1.5.1 Issued land related documents:**

The main task of the chit chairmen was issuing land related documents as a testimony of the land ownership. Enclave dwellers had to exchange their lands through *Chhitmohal* (Enclave) *Nagorik* (Citizen) *Committees*. *Nagorik committee* had induced a paper; *Nagorik committee's* emblem was printed on this page. Land related information and price was written on this induced paper and after signing by the witness this induced paper became testimonial documents for the land in the enclaves. In some cases land had transferred through simple white paper which had no validity.

#### **4.1.5.2 Mitigate the social unrest based on Patron-client relation:**

Social disputes were controlled and judged in the enclaves by informal governance through arbitrary system which was known as *Salaish*. *Chit* chairmen and members had patron-client relationship with the political leaders of Bangladeshi political parties and political leaders from the Bangladeshi territory were involved in *Slalish*. Dwellers were bound to obey the judgment otherwise he/she had to harass inside and outside the enclaves. Dwellers those had good relation with the *Chit* Chairman or political leaders of Bangladesh, got advantage during the arbitration.

“If any dwellers committed the same crime for thrice and proved by judgment, he had to leave the enclave. We had no responsibility to ensure his/her living place. If any Bangladeshi came to loot the enclave, we killed him/her by mass beating.”-said Mister an enclave dweller of *Shalbari*.

#### **4.1.5.3 Informal governance was as a tool of earning:**

*Chit* Chairmen and members enhanced their earnings by used the *Nagorik* committees. They had taken commission from the selling price of land for issuing the land documents. They had taken 10-15 Bangladeshi takas per 1000 Bangladeshi taka for issuing a land documents. It was the main source of their earnings.

*Nagorik* committees earned money by giving leased the River *Ghats*. They also collected money by issuing certificate to trespass the border. Chairman of *Garati* enclave issued an (Figure-2) identity card as a testimony of involvement in the enclave exchange movements. Chairman of *Garati* had taken “two hundred” Bangladeshi taka for issuing an identity card. Chairman inspired them to take the identity card by telling that in future they will treat as freedom fighter. This card will prove them as freedom fighter.




Figure-2: Identity card issued by chairman of *Garati* to prove the involvement in the enclave exchange movement. Source: Collected from *Garati* enclave.

#### 4.1.6 Deprived from state provided amenities; false identities to survive:

Cutoff from the main land they were deprived from all the basic amenities. It was the duty of state to fulfill its inhabitant's needs. State did not do it because of boundary complication. Absence of state bound the dwellers to fulfill their needs from the illegal sources. They were treated as animal in a stateless situation saying an enclave dweller of Behuladanga. She also added that

“Every country had census of its animal. Government knows how many animals they have. If these animals need food and medicine government ensure it. For our cases government did not do anything. Even during natural calamities we did not get any support”.

"We lived in Indian enclaves. So that, we had no legal access to meet basic services from Bangladesh".-said Sirajul Islam, Chairman of the *Behuladanga* enclave. Dwellers were deprived from education, health, and economical activities. In order to ensure those facilities they had to involve in illegal activities. They had to make good relationship with the neighbor citizen. They had to use false address to fulfill the needs.

##### 4.1.6.1 Absence of educational institutes:

Prior to the year of 1952 there were no visa and passport systems, Dwellers had right to chose any other school from India and Bangladesh. Visa and passport system had

introduced from 1952 and this pronouncement had locked the dwellers in the small territory and became stateless citizen.

Cut off from the main stream society of home country, throughout the years, educational scenario in the zone of enclaves had very pathetic (Yunus, 2015). Dwellers were not allowed to enroll in the Bangladeshi school. Some of the enclaves had some schools and Madrasas but because of economical deficiency all were closed. Dwellers used false identity (Bangladeshi identity) to enroll the Bangladeshi schools. Usually, dwellers got admission in the nearby Bangladeshi schools. Some dwellers had finished their higher level of education by using false address. Number of higher degree achiever among the dwellers was very few because they had to overcome mental and physical barriers.

#### **4.1.6.2 Survive without medical facilities:**

Due to non-availability of government intervention they were deprived from all the medical facilities in the enclaves. They were not allowed to enter their homeland to get any medical facilities. They were impeded by both the home and host state's border forces. In order to get medical facilities they had to use false addresses. While their real identity came in the front, they were denied to get medical treatment. As a result they were no opportunity to take medical facilities unless use the fake addresses. To birth a baby woman had to use false address unless they did not get medical facilities. This is meant that Indian enclave people had to entirely rely on the benevolence of Bangladesh.

Enclave dwellers did a hunger strike in front of the Panchagarh sugar mill. During this demonstration some dwellers became sick and took them to the Panchagarh District hospital and admitted them in the Hospital. When hospital administration recognized their true identity, they denied giving the treatment and null the dwellers admission.

#### **4.1.6.3 Economical activities none but agriculture and daily labor:**

Agriculture and daily labor was their main economical activities. Most of the inhabitants were relied upon agriculture. They were not allowed to get any job in the Indian and

Bangladeshi territory. Enclaves had lack of resources so they had no economical activities rather than farming and daily labor. Few enclave dwellers entered the Bangladeshi government services by providing the false address.

Because of unavailability of an agricultural support, they were engaged in basic crops cultivation such as paddy, jute, vegetables. Enclave dwellers sold their agricultural products to the adjacent Bangladeshi market. In some enclaves *Nagorik* committees issued a paper to sell the products in the Bangladeshi market as a dweller. Inhabitants also purchased their products from the Bangladeshi market. In order to sell and purchase in the Bangladeshi market dwellers had to make good relation with the Bangladeshi citizen unless they had to face physical harassment. As they were the citizen of India, many of them never seen Indian currency. Bangladesh currency was used in the former enclaves.

#### **4.1.7 Lack of development activities:**

There was no infrastructural development in enclaves for the sixty years. All the roads were muddy; houses were made by tin or bamboo. No transportation system had inside the enclave. There was no electricity even they had no hope to get electricity. They had passed sixty eight years without the essence light. There was no school, college, market, hospital, clinic, post office, police station. They had no source of pure drinking water, sanitation systems or any other basic facilities.

#### **4.1.8 “Might is right” was the basic rule in the enclave:**

Might is right was the basic practice in the enclaves. Detached from native administration along with absence of judicial procedure, the practice of “Might is Right” was the law of these enclaves. As a result, patron-client relationship was the key factor to survive on this rule less place. Bangladeshi politically backed people were involved in land grabbing, looting, and women harassment. In order to sell or buy from the Bangladeshi markets dwellers had to make good relation with the patron people of Bangladesh.



It was the safe haven for the offender. Based on patron client relation they took shelter in the enclave and informal governance did not do anything. If anyone denied to shelter the offender had to harass. Criminal had a strong relationship with the political masters of Bangladesh.

#### **4.1.9 Absence of women empowerment:**

Women lives were vulnerable than men. There was no judgment on violence against women. Violence against women was a common incident in the enclave. There was no system of marriage registration so divorce followed no rule of law. In informal governance system's men had exercised franchise but women had no power of franchise. Women were not allowed to participate in the informal election.

#### **4.1.9 (i) Political and business interests demolished the boundary complexity:**

Because of judicial complication Bangladeshi government were not allowed to do any activities in the enclaves. Political patrons were involved in some activities in the enclaves for their political interests. Local parliament member of Bangladesh established a primary school in the *Shalbari* enclave (Yunus, 2015). A bridge also made in the *Behuladanga* enclave by the local politicians. Political patrons did it because they had some illegal voter in the enclaves or they wanted to influence in the enclave. Not only political leader but also local administration of Boda Upazilla was involved in illegal activities. In the area of *Shalbari* enclave was a *Ghat* on the bank of *Kartowa* River and it was leased by local administration of Boda Upazilla. Sometime private organization also demolished the boundary because of their political interest such as a culvert was made in the *Shalbari* enclave by Panchagarh sugar mill authority to cultivate the land.

#### **4.1.9(ii) Role of National Identity Card (NID):**

National identity card has a significant role to upon the enclave residents. Two incidents made the enclave dwellers onward to solve the boundary issues. One was introducing

National Identity card (NID) card by the caretaker government and another was a fire incident in the Garati enclave.

Enclave residents were not allowed to fulfill their needs from the Bangladeshi government unless used fake or false address. After introducing the NID card, government made compulsory to show NID card to get various facilities. As a result enclave dwellers faced tremendous problem to get illegal facilities. This decision made residents furious to create the pressure for solving the land disputes. Some dwellers had illegal NID. Clientism and patron client relationship helped them to get false NID because they used them to perform their illegal tasks and also used them to enhance their vote bank for local elections.

#### **4.2 Features of formal governance**

This section of the research has identified the features of formal governance in the former enclaves. Previous section has identified the dwellers antecedent existence and their subsistence in the enclaves under informal governance. This section has induced the dweller's new existence and improvised subsistence. This section deals with two things; firstly has painted the features of formal governance and secondly has discussed about the transformation process of informal governance to formal governance in the former enclaves of Bangladesh after the historical swap.

##### **4.2.1 Achievement of meaningful citizenship:**

Citizenship has played an antecedence role in the mind of former enclave inhabitants rather than any other fundamental rights especially women's right, civil rights, religious rights. Citizenship has an effusive disposition in the human mind because citizenship can ascertain all the legal rights and privileged; those have to ensure by a country and supported by the constitution. From the history of civilization human beings have taken this right very intensely. From the ancient Greek to helpless former enclave residents, all took the right of citizenship very furiously. That's why former enclave dwellers of Bangladesh are very delighted to achieve this right. Though they had a proxy citizenship but it was insignificant.

They were not in a situation to enjoy this citizenship because they were surrounded by another state.

According to Cohen 1999; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Carens 2000; Citizenship should be combination of three dimensions- firstly citizenship needs a legal status. It means citizen should have civil, social and political rights; so that he/she can move freely and have to be the right to get protection by law. Secondly a citizen should able to participate in a society's political institutions. Thirdly citizen should have an identity in the political community. So, citizenship is the subjective sense of belongings.

Before the swap, enclave dwellers were the citizen of India but they apprised them as *Chhiter Manush* or *Chhiter lok* rather than Indian because their host country was incapable to fulfill the characteristics of citizenship. They only ruled by informal government where they had little participation. They were not capable of ruling and they had no participation in social and political intuitions. Their native lands had not ensured neither their participation in, social and political, communities and institutions, nor ensure legal status such as civil, social and political rights. As a result, enclave dwellers had meaningless citizenship. They were surrounded by fence and they had no status, lived as a prisoner. They were not allowed to take part with the formal administration in their native land. So, they initiated informal governance systems.

After the remarkable swap, enclave dwellers get rid off from the barbed wire. Now they have achieved significant citizenship where they are enjoying legal status such as political, social and civil rights. Now they can move at large. Now they are active part of political and social institutions and enjoying all the political rights.

#### **4.2.2 Delighted to Exercise their franchise:**

Voting is the fundamental structure for a democratic country. Franchise is the start of everything in our democracy and is the right for all. It is an inherent virtue for all the citizens of democratic country. Every citizen enjoys this right to vote. Governments is the first-line

actors in the electoral system to protect the individual right of voting (Douglas, 2013). As a stateless society they did not enjoy this right. Former residents of enclaves had no formal governance. Informal governance had arranged some polls in an informal way but it did not fulfill any demands of the dwellers.

Former enclave dwellers had wept for sixty-eight years. Their weep turns into joy by the historical swap. Inhabitants of former enclaves, who recently became Bangladeshi citizens, have exercised their franchise for the first time in union council elections on 1<sup>st</sup> November in 2016. Prior to that Election Commission had taken initiatives to provide National identity card among the former residents of enclaves.

Enclave dwellers had no experience to exercise the franchise in their antecedent existence rather than “*Shalbari-Behuladanga-Kajoldigi-Natoktoka*” *Chhitmohal nagorik committee’s* election. Former enclave residents of those enclaves had enjoyed voting through informal mechanism. Only male residents had experience to exercise the voting power because women were not allowed to exercise this right. Voting and participation is the main principle for democracy (Flanders, 2013). Women of former enclaves have achieved their voting and participation power through formal governance of Bangladesh.

In 1<sup>st</sup> election of the former enclaves on 1<sup>st</sup> November 2016 women had no participation in the *Union Parishad* election. Former enclave residents have observed this delight election. Two residents of former *Garati* enclave have participated as a member candidate and one resident of former *Shalbari* enclave have participated as a member candidate. None of them have won in this election and there was no women candidate.

#### **4.2.3 False replace by True:**

Enclave dwellers had no identity so they had faced various problems in their every step from social lives to economical lives. They used false and fake addresses to fulfill their needs. After the historical swap, dwellers antecedent lives have replaced by formal governance. Now, dwellers are enjoying their identity instead of using false addresses.

In past, dwellers had no contraction with formal governance; informal governance had introduced by the residents of former enclave to survive.

#### **4.2.4 Informal remains in some cases and government initiatives for the benevolent of the former enclave residents:**

Former enclave is now under formal governance. Now formal governance is replacing the informal governance. Formal governance need realistic approach to solve the decade of problems and it has a close relation with informal governance. Formal governance and informal governance have four ways to interact with each other; that are complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive (Helmke et al., 2003).

Historical swap leads the Bangladeshi government to take initiatives for the former enclave's residents. Residents were deprived for six decades and their livelihood were base on informal and illegal mechanisms. It will take time to solve the all problems. Dwellers livelihood were base on informal governance, so if the formal governance replace the whole informal things without any practical judgment, will create tension. Based on situation for the betterment of deprived persons government has kept some informal and illegal things.

##### **4.2.4.1 Inspiration for the education through job replacements; Kept antecedent informal way of education:**

Former dwellers of enclave were deprived from all level of education. Scenarios of education have changed by the swap. Dwellers are getting the opportunity to all level of education through formal governance.

In case of education, false addresses still remain. Dwellers, who admitted in the school of Bangladeshi territories by using false addresses, remain the same false addresses after the swap. If government wants to change the addresses, dwellers have to face difficulties to change the addresses rather keep the previous addresses.

As dwellers are getting job through formal governance, so they are getting more encourage to study. In their antecedent lives they got negligence from their teachers and co-readers rather than courage. Now scenario has changed, society is giving encouragement to the enclave inhabitants to study. Some NGOs, private banks are coming beside the meritorious enclave students. They are giving books, bi-cycles, and scholarships and other facilities to the meritorious students of the enclaves.

#### **4.2.4.2 Job has offered through formal governance by keeping the previous procedure:**

Bangladesh government has arranged special recruitment for the former enclave inhabitants in the forces. By this special arrangement dwellers have joined the government jobs those studied by using false addresses. But according to our law, if anyone has false addresses, are not capable to join the government services. By using the false address to join in forces, is unbelievable as a Bangladeshi citizen. For dwellers, they have joined in government jobs and in various forces. For them, formal governance is compromising with illegal thing which was an outcome informal system for absence of formal governance and acting in accommodative way with the informal governance.

#### **4.2.5 Patron is using the formal governance as a tool of earning:**

Former enclave residents are looking for their basic needs through formal governance while patron or political leaders are using the formal governance as an effective tool of their earnings.

P's (patron and political leaders) have taken education as a profitable business rather than increased the educational opportunity. Around the enclaves, have sufficient schools, but patron and political masters especially former enclaves' chairmen have established schools inside the enclaves by personal initiatives. Have they done it as a social work? They have done it for business interests. Chairmen of enclaves those have a political relations, are advanced to establish a school. Founder of school have thought that by using their power they will nationalize their schools. They also have thought that they were behind in

education for sixty eight years so government will nationalize those schools easily either it is necessary for the enclave dwellers or not.

Small enclave, in size and population but has established more than one school. They are giving the name of school in political ways which are practicing in Bangladesh; such as according to name of ex leader or acting leaders. They have given the school's name with ex leader or acting leader to get favor of political group so that they can easily achieve support from the government. If chairman of ex *chit* (enclave) has established a school, then anti group of this chairman has also done the same thing.

How they are doing business? They are recruiting teacher by taking money as donation. School's founders are saying that this money has necessity to build the school but they are taking excessive teachers and taking huge amount of money from each teacher. On the contrary they are spending little money to build the school because schools are making with cheap raw materials like bamboo and tin.

People are seeking this job because in our country unemployment rate is high. Enclave inhabitants are not getting this opportunity because they have no money to donate. So outside the enclaves are getting this job base on providing money and patron client relationship.

#### **4.2.6 Developing work on progress:**

Developing work is going on. They had insufficiency for sixty eight years, so it will take some time to fulfill their desire. Within this time government has ensured electricity, pure drinking water and sanitation. Inhabitants have gotten those facilities without a pending a single money.

“We never imagine that we will get electricity within this sort time without spending any money. Government has ensured electricity up to our door steps. When we observed exchange, people were saying that we will not see

light in our enclaves in our life time”. - said a dweller of former Shalbari enclave.

Still infrastructures are very poor in enclave. Culvert, bridges are made by bamboo. Roads are muddy. Many schools have established in the enclaves for business purposes but there is no hospital, clinic in the enclaves even there is no community clinic.

#### **4.2.7 Women empowerment:**

Women were not allowed to be a candidate in the enclave councils. They had no voting power. Now they have achieved voting power and can be a candidate of any election. Violence against women was a common incident in the former enclave and had no judgment. Daughter's guardian became fear to give marriage inside the enclave because there was no rule. Now daughter's guardians are giving marriage to the dwellers without any fear. Violence against women will judge through formal governance. Marriage is registering to ensure the proper rights to the women.

#### **4.2.8 Blame game is going on:**

Some enclave dwellers are showing unhappiness regarding government initiatives. Inhabitants are unhappy to their ex-*chit* chairmen and members as they were unhappy in the past. In their past enclave lives they were suppressed by *chit* chairmen through informal governance. Now they are blaming ex- *chit* chairmen for not giving enough aids. This is true in some cases where patron client relationship is playing the role to give the government aids. Inhabitants of *Garati*, *Behuladanga*, and *Shalbari* are claiming about patron-client relationship. Chairmen are also blaming the government not to give enough aids. Now blame game is a common incident in the former enclave. It is also the common incidents in all over the Bangladesh. They have an insufficiency for sixty eight years; practically it will take some time to solve their problems.



### 4.3 Land Management

This section has induced the formalization processes of land. Land is a very sensitive issue in the former enclave and there was no legal way to manage the land. So this research has given more emphasized over the land issues. This section has deal with three sections. Firstly this has looked on the historical burden and facts followed by informal land management systems in the former enclaves. Finally has identified the pros and cons of land formalization process and their loop hole.

Conflicts are now coming in the front. After passing a single day (2<sup>nd</sup> August 2016) of historical exchange we observed a clash between two sides in *Dashia Chara*, Kurigram (Bulbul, 2015).

After the historical exchange enclave dwellers become worried over their land The India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement, when implemented, does promise a national identity for the residents of the enclaves up for swap, but they are worried over their lands (bdnews24.com, 18<sup>th</sup> may 2015).

#### 4.3.1 Why Land is important:

Land is the most valuable resources for most of the country. It is more than an asset. Land has closed relationship with identity, history and culture. Now a day world is facing various types of problems. Those are climate change, natural disaster, food security, rapid and unplanned urbanization, poverty, violence and conflict etc. many of those are directly or indirectly related to land. Mitigate of those challenges become more difficult where land management is not up to the mark. So land is a very sensitive issue (Palmer et al., 2009).

“land governance concerns the rules, processes and structures through which decisions are made about access to land and its use, the manner in which the decisions are implemented and enforced, the way that competing interests in land are managed” (Palmer et al., 2009:09).

Land governance encompasses statutory, customary and religious institutions, as well as informal institutions. It covers traditional practices governing land transactions, inheritance and dispute resolution. In short, it includes all relevant institutions from the state, civil society and private sectors (Palmer et al., 2009:10). The use of traditional and informal governance has proven effective in dealing with land disputes in a number of countries. Informal governance has also established formal linkages between decisions made through courts and the formal enforcement mechanisms of the state (Wehrmann et al., 2009).

#### **4.3.2 Historical burden:**

Land has various aspects such as social, economic and environmental. It has different meanings for different people. Generally, people look at it as an area which is not covered by water and they utilize it (land) to fulfill their purposes. Land is the symbol of dignity. For this, people look at their country as their land. Enclave dwellers' views are not anomalous. For enclave dwellers, land is a very sensitive and important possession as it was in the past.

During the partition, in 1947, Hindus and Muslims from both sides either sold or exchanged their properties. In Bangladesh's enclaves, most of the Hindus sold their land to the migrated Muslims and moved to the Indian enclaves. And many Muslims also came from Indian enclaves to the enclaves of Bangladesh by purchasing or exchanging their land. In 1947, geographical boundary had less significance while inhabitants from both sides could move easily to other sides of the territories. Religion played the emergent role to this migration in 1947. During the Hindu-Muslim riot in 1965, both Hindus and Muslims exchanged or sold their ancestral possessions to migrate. In 1965, they might think that by this exchange of their domicile, they might be able to change their ill fate. Did it happen?

#### **4.3.3 Geographical boundary dismantled religious concept in the enclaves:**

Geographical boundary or religion or humanity which came in forward in the enclaves? They had created their illegal and informal movement from the beginning. Many Indian people (Basically Hindus) who lived in the enclaves of Bangladesh (Indian territories) moved to

Bangladeshi territories (Indian enclaves) and vice versa for Muslims. They gave the priority of religion rather than geography, so that Muslims tried to come closer to the Muslim's country and Hindu's did the vice versa. But later it proved as a wrong where geography had played the cardinal role over the religion. Neither Muslims majority country (Bangladesh) nor Hindus majority country (India) came to assist the Muslims and Hindus respectively.

If any problems arise among Hindus community inside the Bangladesh, Indian government shows deep concern. On the contrary, if any problems arise in Muslims community in Indian territories, Bangladesh government expresses deep concern over those issues. What happened for hapless enclave dwellers? Enclave dwellers in both sides were deprived from all the indispensable elements but the governments from both sides behavior were like inanimate. Geo graphical boundary played the cardinal role over religion and humanity. Their misfortune remained constant; latterly it degraded as they were not allowed to go their main land to perform any administrative work nor they got any humanitarian aids from neither country (Bangladesh and India).

#### **4.3.4 Initial stage of land management:**

After the partition up to several years inhabitants of these regions did not face any barrier to entire their native land to accomplish their obligation. By this unrestricted passage, they could accomplish; especially their land related tasks; such as taxes, registration etc. They paid taxes to their native government but did not get any advantages from their own country. From the early 70s inhabitants had to face harassment by border security forces. Harassment had increased after the late 80s. Up to 1992, dwellers were allowed to go their main territory (India) by showing the identity card to the Border Security Forces (BSF). This card was issued by *chit* chairmen. After make shift use of this card, BSF began to refuse to entry to the India. As a result from 1992, dwellers were not allowed to enter the India.

#### **4.3.5 Introducing informal systems for land management:**

From the beginning of the partition enclave dwellers were denied from all the fundamental objects. They were not allowed to go to their motherland easily to perform any tasks. As a result they introduced informal governance to solve their needs. They had formed a council as like the union council of Bangladesh where geo-graphical proximity played the cardinal role to form it. This *Chit* council had brought in informal mechanisms to the land related issues where Patron-client relationships were the prevalent factor to take any decisions as the dwellers were not allowed to go to the home land.

#### **4.3.6 Informal land management:**

Council had issued informal documents as a testimony of land exchange. Some council had strike out a special type of paper which was bedecked with their emblem, in which paper they were written the details of land transfer (Figure-2). Because of unavailability of emblem printed paper, council used simple white paper (Figure-3) or Bangladeshi stamp as a testimony of land exchange; which was available at this condition. In the presence of witness *chit* council issued those informal land documents and deeds as well. Council charged some fees for issuing those papers. This was gigantic earnings for the council chairmen and members. Enclave dwellers were bound to follow those documents unless the patron and their sycophant disrupt the documents and deeds.

#### **4.3.7 Might is right over the land issue:**

Enclave dwellers had no choice rather than follow the informal governance. In many cases, helpless dwellers faced awful experience from the *Chit* council whom had the mandate to set up the informal governance. Like all other purposes, enclave dwellers were relied on informal governance for their land; where *might is right* was the customs and principles. Puissant community snatched the land from hapless dwellers either by muscle power or by the absence of the dwellers. Chairmen and members of *Chit* council's were the key swindler to take any decision regarding land. Absence of formal governance; made the councils as a key player to ensure governance through informal mechanisms.

Most of the chairman of *Chit* council had twofold citizenship. They had relationship with Bangladeshi citizen with various ways; such as; paternal relation, maternal relation, wedlock etc. They had identity of both as *Chhiter Manush* (Enclave dwellers) and Bangladeshi. They used their individuality or twofold identity according to their interests to gratify their needs, especially for grabbed the land. Not only chairmen and members but also many enclave inhabitants had dual identity. Those who had dual identity made a patron-client relationship and were involved in illegal activities. Most of the relatives of chairmen and members were involved in the politics of Bangladesh. As a result Patron-client relationship and Clientelism played utmost role over the hapless inhabitants of enclaves. Geo-graphical proximity had created Patron-client relationship and Clientelism in this stateless state. Chairmen and their follower had huge muscle power over the enclave dwellers. By using this muscle power either they or their follower both from inside or outside the enclaves snatched the land.

#### **4.3.8 Worried over the land after the swap:**

After the swap, they were worried over their land. The India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement, when implemented, does promise a national identity for the residents of the enclaves up for swap, but they became worried over their lands. They were concerned about not to have papers for the land. Prior to historical exchange, enclave dwellers were used to sell and buy their land through *Chhitmohal* Council or only by word of faith. After the exchange those issued paper have no validity. So they were pondering over their land and informal documents which were issued by *chit* councils because of absence of formal governance as a testimony of land swap.

“..... We were not allowed to go to India to register our purchase. We have no other document. We bought it on word of faith. Many we bought the land from have died. Their children are here. If they claim the land after this becomes Bangladesh, what would we do?” -Said a former Enclave dweller of *Garati*.

That was discontinued after border complications. They did not pay their taxes from that time. Many of them have all documents but taxes were pending. They have the formal documents of previous nationality but their nationalities have changed. Now this formal document turns into invalid documents and many have any documents.

“If you do not pay taxes regularly, you lose ownership of the land. We paid taxes regularly. After the Bangladesh’s liberation, my uncle was going to pay taxes. But he was detained by the BSF at the border and sent to prison.”-said a former enclave dweller of *Behuladanga*.




Fig: 3: Land transfer document issued by Garati Chit Chairman. It is the informal way of land transfer.

Source: Collected from Garati enclave







#### **4.3.9 Government initiatives towards the land formalization:**

Government has taken this issue intensely. Government established seven members *Upazilla* committee headed by *Upazilla Nirbahi Officer* (UNO). This seven members committee was responsible to identify the owner of the land. In order to solve the dissatisfaction government has induced the appeal systems by two tiers. One is to the *Upazilla* committee and another is to the District committee. Enormous numbers of employee from local administration of *Upazilla* were involved in field survey. They did an extensive work to mark the land owner.

##### **4.3.9.1 Method to identify the land owner ship:**

They did it on the basis of occupancy. Surveyor teams went to the land physically and took the witness of a landowner's surrounding (east, west, north and south). Witness bearer gave the testimony that this land is belonging to him and this land is under his control. Though, this is a good procedure to solve this controversial land disputes but land grabber get massive benefit from this process. They snatched huge lands in the former enclave by using patron-client relationship or clientelism. Land grabbing is common phenomena in Bangladesh. Powerful people of Bangladesh are very cunning to grab others land. Former enclaves with its Small territories and population were within a big country. Those enclaves were influenced by big force. As a result of geo-graphical proximity, land grab in the enclaves were not any anomalous incident.

“I sold two *Bigha* of my land. I have documents of selling which was issued by *chit* council. But buyer has grabbed my two and half *Bigha* land. I showed my documents but I do not get any result.”-said a former enclave dweller of *Garati chit*.

Suppose a grabber has fifty *Bigha* of land. Among this amount of land he/she might be grabbed his middle part of the land and his/her surroundings land are his/her legal land. In this case his/her surroundings neighbors will give the testimony that he/she are the owner of this land though his/her middle part of the land is not legal. If the real land owner of this

middle part comes to claim this land, he/she will not get any testimony from surrounding because surroundings lands have the legal ownership of the grabber.

#### **4.3.9.2 *Adhiar* problem to identify the land owner ship:**

Former enclave dwellers many cases give the land to the *Adhiar* to cultivate the land. *Adhiar* is a term used to identify a person who cultivates other's land and share the crops with the land owner. *Adhiar* is not owner of the land. In the former enclave, land owner gave the land to the *Adhiar* for couple of years based on terms and condition. *Adhiar* occupied the land for the given years and had share their benefit based on deeds. Land demarcations have done on the basis of occupancy; have created problem between the *Adhiar* and land owner. Though land is formalized based on occupancy, *Adhiar* become the owner of the land but he is not real land owner. In Putimari enclave seventy six acres of land has declared as *Khas* because of ownership problem.

#### **4.3.9.3 Land ownership by Bangladeshis in foreign territory; Legal or illegal:**

Bangladeshi citizen, Council' chairmen, members and those who had dual identity are the land owner of the almost sixty percentage of the total enclave's land. Can a Bangladeshi citizen purchase or grab land in the Indian Territory? According to law no Bangladeshi can purchase or grab the land in the Indian Territory. A veteran former enclave dweller said

"I asked this question to the Indian high commissioner of Bangladesh. How a Bangladeshi can be an owner of the Indian land. I also said that land ownership should be based on the census of 2011. For saying this, later, I have to face imprisonment and got bail from Bangladesh High court".

UNO of Boda Upazilla under Panchagarh district said,

"We do not find any wrong on this issue. Now these territories belong to Bangladesh. Land owner is Bangladeshi. If he occupied this land and supported by his surrounding's land owner. We consider him as a land

owner. Hmm perhaps, previously he purchased the land from Indian Territory. But the situation was different on that time. If any enclave dwellers need money, what they did? Enclave dwellers had not enough money to purchase this land. So they sold it outside the territory.”

Bangladeshi citizens bought land through informal governance and Bangladesh government has considered those issues in a positive way. Government does not throw off the informal mechanisms keeping it with formal governance in complementary way.

#### **4.3.9.4 Appeal for dissatisfaction to land formalization:**

After the survey, government has given fifteen days to settle the disputable issues with the *Upazilla* committee. If anyone has objection, he has alleged to this committee within fifteen days. This committee has tried to solve the issues by mutual understandings or advised them to solve it outside the office based on their available informal documents. If appellant does not satisfied, he has chance to appeal to the deputy commissioner (DC). Most of the cases all the committees have tried to solve the issues by mutual understandings. Since dwellers have expertise on informal mechanisms, so government also encourages them to solve by informal way. After those mentioned procedure if fail to reach any solution; government has declared it as *Khas* land. . In Putimari enclave seventy six acres of land has declared as *Khas* because of ownership problem.

#### **4.3.9.5 Further steps of land formalization; sealing of land yet to solve:**

Land demarcation is the vital things for solving the land disputes. Government has done this thing and next procedure of land formalization is going on. Further steps are creating the paper based documents. After identify the land owner with the help of formal and informal mechanisms, government has prepared map and give a documents to the inhabitants known as *chitta* number (Figure-5).

[illegible]

Inhabitants will get their final documents after the completion of some official procedure. There is another question yet to solve regarding land sealing. According to our land law no one can be owner of more than sixty *Bigha* land. Among dweller and land grabber many of them have more than hundred *Bigha* of land. Many dwellers have more than sixty *Bigha* of land. How government will solve this issues yet to see.

#### 4.4 Beneficiaries Group by this swap

Gain is in two categories; tangible and intangible. Tangible gain means cash and intangible means kind. Tangible benefits are those that are easily quantifiable in financial and physical

terms whereas intangible benefits are harder to quantify and are non-physical in nature. (Logsdon and Wood, 2002; Orlitsky et al., 2003 cited Nurn and Tan, 2010). Tangible gain and intangible both are important because it leads each other.

By observe the previous scenarios of enclaves, what were their conditions? And now after the exchange, what are their achievements. By analyzing, this study has found both satisfied and dissatisfied people. Satisfactions and dissatisfactions depend on the demand and expectations. Depending on the demand and expectations in former enclaves have both satisfied and dissatisfied inhabitants. By this swap all the dwellers; patron and clients; are beneficiary. There are no disputes on this issue. They have achieved more important thing as a human being is citizenship and identity. In case of intangible gain; citizenship, legal status, fundamental rights, all (Patron and client) are benefited from this swap. Patrons comparatively have achieved more benefit over the dwellers for tangible gains such as assets, benefits from the country, power etc.

#### **4.4.1 Gain achieved by the dwellers; both tangible and intangible:**

##### **4.4.1.1 Country less become a member of a country:**

Before the swap, they were country less in spite of having a country. They were the inhabitants of India but they were not allowed to enter their native land. They were deprived from all fundamental elements but their homeland had not ensured anything. Because of boundary complications home land were unable to perform any tasks. They had to face imprisonment if they enter their main land. In spite of being a citizen of India, they had to harass by BSF (Border security force). They had no freedom to move. They had to enter the Bangladesh illegally in order to full fill their needs.

Citizenship is an essence of subjective matter. Dwellers were the citizen of India but deprived from all the essence of citizenship such as legal status, rights, and basic needs. In spite of being a citizen of India, was unable to full fill their subjective matter. They had a proxy citizenship.

All the inhabitants of enclave get a country, now they are citizen of country. They can move at large. All the inhabitants get benefit to get a country. Now they are citizen of a Bangladesh. Now inhabitants are enjoying the essences of citizenship.

“Before the establishment of *Natun* (New) Bangladesh, no one respected us. Now everyone is respecting us. Now we have citizenship and we will get state benefits” said hilariously Hasina begum an enclave dweller of Shalbari”.

Enclave dwellers are introducing their enclaves as *Natun* (New) Bangladesh. All the enclave dwellers have identified to be a citizen of Bangladesh is their main achievement. From patron to hapless, all the enclaves have gotten benefit for being a citizen of Bangladesh. Now all the inhabitants are getting the fundamental needs from their country, it is now country’s duty to ensure all the characteristic of a citizenship. There is no deviation of benefit to be a citizen among the inhabitants.

#### **4.4.1.2 Identity less people gets their identity:**

Before the historical swap dwellers had neither citizenship nor identity. Because of absence of their homeland they were state less. As a result they had no identity. They were treated as animal; neither any country had ensured their needs. In order to fulfill their needs they had to use false identity unless their true identity. In some cases they had to produce false father and mother’s name. They felt guilty to produce their false identities but they had nothing to do. In order to survive they had to use false identities.

After the swap, they get their identity. Now all the inhabitants are enjoying the benefit of to get an identity. Enclave dwellers are now using their true identity to fulfill their needs.

“Our dignities were less than an animal because every country has census of their animals but we had not any census. Every country looks at their animals but our homeland even did not do that. No one respected us. Now we get our own identity. We are very pleased to get our identity”-saying an enclave dweller of *Garati*

#### **4.4.1.3 Achievement of legal status:**

A citizen should have some legal status. It is the duty of native country to ensure that legal status even the citizen stay in abroad. But dwellers enjoyed no legal status. They had no civil, social, political rights. They were not allowed to free movement.

After the exchange, enclave dwellers have achieved their legal status. Now they have achieved their legal status. Now they are enjoying free movement and Bangladesh's government have ensured their civil, political and social rights. From hapless dwellers to patron all are getting the advantage of legal status. Clientelism is playing the role to get more advantages from the legal status. Those who have or had a good relation with the political masters or influential are getting more advantages. Previous *chit* chairmen and members have engaged in local politics. In their past lives *Chit* council ruled informally and now they are ruling formally.

Ex members and chairmen were very interested to create new union for their enclaves. But government denied it. It was a good decision by Honorable prime minister of Bangladesh. It was a secret agenda by the ex chairmen because they wanted to rule the *chit* formally forever, though there was very people to engage in political institutions.

#### **4.4.1.4 Conquer the fundamental needs:**

In their previous lives dwellers were deprived from all of their fundamental needs. Because of boundary complication native country were unable to ensure the all fundamental needs. So, in order to fulfill their fundamental needs they were relied upon on Bangladesh illegally. Food, dress shelter, education, medical are the fundamental needs. According to our constitution government is bound to ensure the fundamental needs for the entire citizen. After the swap government has established their fundamental needs.

1. Now they are allowed to take education from the school. In previous lives they were not allowed to enter the schools. They had to use false identity to admit into the

school. Now they are enjoying their educational rights. Even some private organizations are giving scholarship to the dwellers for inspiration.

2. They were deprived from all the medical facilities. They had no chance to get medical facilities even a small medicine from their native land unless using the false addresses. Illegally they got medical facilities from the Bangladesh. They were not allowed to get medical facilities from the government hospitals. After the exchange, as like Bangladeshi citizen, all the dwellers are getting all the medical facilities.
3. Dwellers were not allowed to get any food, clothing, shelter facilities. Even during natural calamity such as flood, drought, excessive rain no country help them. They came back from their ill fate by their hard work as all the dwellers are hard worker. Now it is the government duty ensure this.

#### **4.4.1.5 Enjoying voting power:**

As they had proxy citizenship, they had no voting power. Exercise of voting power is one of the fundamental elements for democracy. Now all the dwellers have achieved this power. Recently they have used their voting power in *Union Parishad* election. All the dwellers are very happy to achieve this voting power. Dwellers have exercised their first franchise on 1<sup>st</sup> November 2016 and they have observed this day by careful way. Women have enjoyed their first voting experience.

#### **4.4.1.6 Informal verses formal:**

In their past lives they were ruled by informal mechanisms. It had no legal bindings. Now everything is under formal governance. Because of absence of formal governance innocent were deprived from justice. Now all have equal opportunities to get justice. For tangible gains patron are getting more benefit from this exchange. Though all are getting benefit but patron are getting more benefit from this.



#### **4.4.1.7 Land formalizations:**

In enclave there were no uniformity and legality of land and land related issues. Some were based on faith and some were by informal mechanisms. As a result there was no rule of law. Big forces grabbed lot of lands and even many Bangladeshis had occupied or grabbed huge lands by illegally or legally. After the swap government is formalizing the land by occupancy basis. Land occupier will be the owner of the land. Through this method land grabber are becoming the owner of the land. It should be the combination of previous informal documents and social arbitrations. Everyone has changed to appeal to the UNO and DC for injustice. But they are saying to the dwellers to meet up the issues outside the office by arbitrations. If they failed it will be *Khas* land of the government.

Though by formalization of land dwellers are getting their formal and legal documents but grabbers are becoming an owner of their grab land on the basis of occupancy.

#### **4.4.1.8 Increasing of earnings:**

Before the swap *chit* chairmen and members had earned through informal system. They took various types fees for supplying the documents such as land registrations, issuing identity card, issuing card to enter their native land. By those things they have earned huge. Now after the exchange their earnings have increased. They have taken the education as their business. They have established schools, colleges, madrasas in their own land and have established the infrastructures by spending small money. Then they are recruiting teachers and staffs and taking huge money as a donation. By their recruitment, inhabitants are not getting the job because they have not enough money to give the donation. Inhabitants from outside the enclaves are getting jobs on those schools. Excessive teachers have been taken to earn more money as donation. Clientelism is playing the role on this business. They are giving the name of their institutions according to political master's name to nationalize easily.

#### **4.4.1.9 Women empowerment:**

Women have achieved empowerment. Women had no empowered in the former enclaves. They have achieved voting power. They have a chance to be a candidate in election. In recent election no women have participated in the election but they have exercised franchise. Violence against women will be judged in the formal governance. All women are enjoying their empowerment.

#### **4.4.2 Case studies:**

This research has done three case studies to distinguish the beneficiary groups. Three dwellers from three characteristics have selected as a case. One is *ex-chit* chairman who is a patron, another is a helpless dweller and last one who is very loyal to patron. By analyzing these cases this research has given a smooth view of beneficiary groups.

##### **4.4.2.1 Case one:**

An enclave dweller, Babul khan, he lived a comfortable life before the swap. Now he is living comfortable life as well. His father, Nurul Khan was a citizen of Behar. In 1947 during the partition he came to live in the *Garati* enclave. At that time they had faced little difficulties as an enclave dweller. By the time being when boundary disputes came in the front their lives became more difficult. He got married with a Bangladeshi lady beside his enclave. At that time his identities did not make any difficulties to get married. But his elder son, Babul Khan, face difficulties to get married. At first babul khan had hidden his identities to get married with a Bangladeshi citizen Nasima, when his new bride, Nasima had known the identity of babul khan as an enclave dweller, got scared to stay in the enclave because as a Bangladeshi citizen if she faced any bad situation, no one can helped her. Administration personnel were not allowed to enter the enclave. Babul khan was a good man so; Nasima did not face any bad situation but during her marriage a new bride were killed in the *Garati* enclave.

Babul khan lived a luxurious life in his enclave life as like present. By using his false address he admitted in the school within the Bangladeshi territory. He went to Singapore by using Bangladeshi passport. He took Bangladeshi passport by using false addresses and went to

Singapore as a Bangladeshi citizen. He lived there for ten years and came back to Bangladesh. After arrived in Bangladesh he has involved in stone business in Bangladesh and built a home in Panchagarh district. His father's also had opportunity to stay in Bangladesh but he did not do it because of his huge land ownership in the enclave.

After the exchange he is doing the same business which he did it past. There is nothing new in his life after the exchange. Only thing he has achieved that all of his false and illegal activities have turned into valid. Now he and his family are enjoying citizenship. He is unhappy over *Ex-chit* chairmen. *Ex-Chit* chairman and Babul khan both have established a school and want to dominate over the former enclave dwellers.

#### **4.4.2.2 Case Two:**

Sirajul islam was a chairman of *Shalbari* enclave under *Debigong* Upazilla in the *Panchagarh* district. He was one of the leaders of Bangladesh India Enclave Exchange committee. During his enclave lives he ruled his inhabitants with informal governance. He lived very comfortable life in the enclave by being a chit chairman. He and his members had monthly income as a salary of chairman and member. His members had fixed salary but as chairman he had not any fixed salary, all the money earning by chit council belongs to him. Chit council earned money from land registration, giving the lease of river *Ghat* etc. He had huge land. Enclave dwellers said that chairman stay in enclave at day time to rule and for sleep he stayed at Bangladeshi home. His son had national identity card of Bangladesh proved that they had the dual citizenship.

After the exchange he has formalized all of his assets. He has legalized his fake identities and citizenship. Now he along with other chit chairmen and members are demanding recognitions as Bangladeshi freedom fighter. Now he is unhappy because of not reorganization by the government for the status freedom fighter.

#### **4.4.2.3 Case three:**

"My father kept my name Dukhu (Sadist) so how my sad will vanish. It is not my fault. It is the fault of my father why he kept this name" said a formerclave dweller of *Garati* enclave. "He also said that we are very happy to be a

citizen and we get our identity. Previously we had no identity. We were treated as an animal. Now we have achieved voting power. We can move freely. But our economical conditions are bad. We get electricity, is a huge thing but we need some more economical opportunity to survive. Chit chairman are getting huge aids but we got only some rice and a blanket. Land grabber garbed my land, are becoming the owner of this land”.

Dukhu was very poor, deprived from all the amenities in the past lives. After the historical swap state has taken initiatives to ensure all the fundamental needs to the enclave dwellers. Dukhu is looking government initiatives but because of patron-client relationship he is not achieving all the state benefits. As poor he needs some economical benefit. Though government is doing but it may be inadequate or not coming to their hand because of patron-client relation.

After the above discussions and case analysis this study has summarized the information as a table. By analyzing the table it is very easy to identify the beneficiary groups’ base on tangible and intangible gain where patron-client relation is the dominant factor.

So from the above discussions research has found that demand varies person to person and as a result satisfaction also varies person to person. All the dwellers have achieved both tangible and intangible gain. Patron and client have achieved both the gain but for tangible gain patron and client are getting more benefit over the dwellers .Government is trying as his best but as a developing country we should wait because we have scarcity of resources.

Beneficiary groups are summarized in the below table:

Achievement by swap	Type of Gain	Beneficiary	Remarks
Citizenship	Intangible	All dwellers	
Identity	Intangible	All dwellers	
Legal status (Social, economical, civil)	Intangible	All dwellers	Patrons and clients who are loyal to patrons have more benefit
Franchise	Intangible	All dwellers	
Fundamental needs	Tangible	All dwellers	Patrons and clients who are loyal to patrons have more benefit
Job opportunity	Tangible	All dwellers	Patrons and clients who are loyal to patrons have more benefit
Women empowerment	Intangible	All dwellers	
Land formalization	Tangible	All dwellers	Patrons and clients who are loyal to patrons have more benefit
Formalization	Tangible	All dwellers	Patrons and clients who are loyal to patrons have more benefit
Economical activities	Tangible	All dwellers	Patrons and clients who are loyal to patrons have more benefit
Development work	Tangible	All dwellers	Patrons and clients who are loyal to patrons have more benefit

Table 1: Summarize the beneficiary groups based on above discussion

## Chapter Five

### Data Analysis

This chapter deals with data analysis of extensive field work and recapitulates with theoretical discussions. Firstly has discussed about the dwellers' former lives in the enclaves. This section has found the root causes of absence of state in the former enclaves. Secondly, this chapter deals with the transformation processes in the former enclaves. It has shown how transformation process is going with the presence of state. Helmke and Levitsky's model of four-fold typology of formal-informal interaction has discussed to see the transformation process.

#### **5.0 No unique theory to observe the informal institutions:**

Informal institute is the heart of anthropological study and it has achieved little attention by scholar in the field of comparative political science. Most of the studies have given its effort to see the effect of informal institute rather it to find out the causes of emergence and its transformation process (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003) (Radnitz, 2009).

Formal institutions emerge from formal rules and public official are mostly responsible to formulate the rules. This is very easy to explain but informal institutes emerge from societal rules, clan network, and patron-client relationship (Zenger, et.al, 2001). This phenomenon differs among societies. Customary rules, pattern of patron-client relationship etc differs among the societies. Women's are more liberal in United States rather than Afghanistan. Informal institutions will not same pattern in the United States and Afghanistan. So it is very difficult to study the emergence and changes of informal institutes because it differs among societies, casts, regions etc. Tribe of the Maymansingh, district of Bangladesh, "*Garro*" is known for female dominate society. Their informal governance systems regarding female

domination will not be same as other part of Bangladesh. So it is hard to take the informal governance under a single umbrella.

### **5.1 Informal governance**

State was absence in the enclave and had created a protection gap in the former enclaves. This protection gap induced illegal and informal mechanisms in the former enclaves. Why state has created this protection gap. Lack of resources and unsuitable location were the reasons to create the protection gap. Lack of resources and unsuitable of location had made them less interest to dominate in this region.

This research has analyzed the past enclave lives and informal governance by one models that is Rashid Gabdulhakov five steps model induced in 2014. He has identified the five reasons that may affect the enclave. This research has analyzed the enclaves of Bangladesh and has identified the reasons; why native land did not show any interest in the former enclave. Negligence by the state had created vulnerable lives for the dwellers for sixty eight years and created protection gap for six decades.

#### **5.1.1 Rashid Gabdulhakov's five steps model:**

Gabdulhakov in 2014 induced five steps model to induce the interaction between the actors. Based on this five characteristic actors can decide what types of roles they should played in the enclaves. This model also induced the reasons of conflicts among the actors. It also indicated the root causes of suffering in the enclaves. According to Gabdulhakov (2014), there are five basic characteristics those effect the enclaves. Those are as follows:

1. Territorial location has an impact on the enclave. If the enclave is located in the middle of the surrounding state's or on a major road may create tensions.
2. Identity of enclave dwellers is significant in the relations between the entire actor's that is between enclave and its surrounding state. If the dwellers introduced them or

identify with the surrounding state; have a possibility to absorb the enclave with the surrounding state.

3. Resources have a vital role in the enclave. If an enclave has ample source of resources or located in the way of natural resource, are likely to create tension. Surrounding state and native state both wants to dominate or, if rich enough and self sufficient enough, may tempt the enclave to demand independence.
4. Financial deprivation in the enclave, limited resources, limited job opportunities and rapid population growth are likely to cause anxiety among the enclave dwellers and force them to seek opportunities in the surrounding state, thus increasing the influence of the later on the enclave.
5. Concrete legal agreements help define the status of the enclave, and thus terminate speculations and provocations. Legal status of the enclave is usually defined based on history. If the states do not agree on the status of the enclave and refer to contradicting legal documents, then the status of the enclave becomes a fluctuating notion and may cause conflicts and battles over land and its legal status.

#### **5.1.1.1 Reasons to create protection gap in the enclaves and main causes of sufferings:**

According to Gabdulhakov (2014), there are five basic characteristics that help to analyze the scenario of enclaves. Those are location of territory, identity, resources, financial deprivation and concrete legal agreements.

If an enclave has a location of the center of state may create attention by the actors. Native land wants to dominate the enclave because it has a geo-graphical advantage to dominate other state through enclave. Locations of the Bangladeshi enclaves were not lucrative it was near the border of India and Bangladesh. Because of its location neither Bangladesh nor India showed any interest to dominate the enclave on the contrary Indian government had deployed their Navy forces to a disputable zone between Bangladesh and India to grab the *Talpotti* Island in the Bay of Bengal. It shows location has a significant meaning. Enclaves



were deprived from its State's interest because of its location and created protection gap. It had induced gigantic sufferings for them.

If an enclave has enough resources, actors show more interest to dominant the enclave. Bangladeshi enclaves (Belong to Indian Territory) had no resources and its locations were not to the path of any resources. So, India did not showed any interest to dominate the enclaves. It was another reason to be absence of a state and causes to create the protection gap along with sufferings.

Financial deprivation in the enclave, limited resources, limited job opportunities and rapid population growth are likely to cause anxiety among the enclave dwellers and force them to seek opportunities in the surrounding state, thus increasing the influence of the later on the enclave. Bangladeshi enclaves had lack of resources as a result enclave dwellers looked for opportunity in Bangladesh illegally. This illegal dependency enhances the influence of Bangladesh in the former enclaves.

Identity of enclave dwellers is significant in the relations between the entire actor's that is between enclave and its surrounding state. If the dwellers introduced them or identify with the surrounding state; have a possibility to absorb the enclave with the surrounding state. It had happened for the enclaves of India and Bangladesh.

#### **5.1.1.2 State created protection gap enhance the suffering and induced the informal systems through patron-client relationship:**

Absence of state creates an environment to formulate the informal mechanisms (Plogeer, 2010). Absence of state create protection gap as result informal governance gets a platform to flourish over there. Absence of native state also gives a window for other state to dominate over there. India had given the window to dominate their land by Bangladesh. Absence of government created this type of opportunity to rule the other state.

There was no presence of state in the former enclave and enclave dwellers were not allowed to enter in their main land. As a result they were deprived from all the basic needs. They were stateless citizen; treated as animal .Enclave dwellers had felt unsecured for the sixty eight years and this protection gap create informal mechanisms in the former enclaves. They had induced informal mechanisms and illegal activities to block this state provided protection gap. This protection gap also had created window for Bangladesh to influence in the former enclaves. Bangladeshi political leaders had played vital role in the former enclaves by created a patron-client relationship with the enclave dwellers.

Patron-client relationship, clientelism are the basic characteristics of the informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003). Patron-client relationship is an unequal relation between the superior and inferior, based on asymmetric exchange of services (Pelras, 1990). Bangladeshi political masters had created an unequal relationship with the enclave dwellers. This relationship made the dwellers life very costly. Including all the criminal activities; Crime, violence, land grabbing, looting were the common incidents in the former enclaves and it was the safe zone for all the offenders. State created protection gap induced the informal governance to fill the protection gap and patron-client relationship is the common practice for all the informal institutions.

#### **5.1.1.3Protection gaps had created a window for the geo graphical interference:**

Patron-client relationship may be between any types of actors; such as person-person, state-state. Patron-client relationship may be between the two independent states where stronger country gives various support to the weaker state depending on the geo-political interest of the stronger state. Relation between China and Cambodia are the example of patron client relation, it is known as Sino-Cambodian relationship (Ciorciari, 2013). In Sino-Cambodian relationship; china acts as a patron and Cambodia roles as a client. In order to dominate in the ASEAN countries more specifically to dominate in the South China Sea, china create this relation and Cambodian elite government gets economic and political benefit from the china. Although small states often seek great-power support, their leaders seldom if ever wish to become “*clients*” (Ciorciari, 2013:05).

Absence of state had created Bangladesh more powerful state than India but India is a big country compares to Bangladesh. Bangladeshi territory had induced buffer area and created protection gap inside the enclave. This protection gap had created patron-client relationship between two countries Bangladesh and India where Bangladesh was patron and India acted as client. This patron-client relationship was the only solution to survive through illegal and informal way. Enclave dwellers were relied upon on Bangladesh for education, health, social lives etc. Bangladeshi political masters also played the role in their informal governance such as in arbitrations, in *Chit* (Enclave) council etc.

Lack of resources, unfavorable location had created no interest to rule the native states. Absence of state had created the protection gap. Protection gap had opened a window for Bangladesh to influence the enclaves. Influence of Bangladesh and protection gap had created patron-client relationship and informal governance systems. Influence of Bangladesh or geo-graphical proximity and patron-client relationship was the basic characteristics of livelihood and informal governance in the enclaves.

State nature both native and surrounding is another factor to analyze the enclaves. In case of Bangladeshi enclaves, political nature of Bangladesh played role in the enclaves. Patron-client relationship was the way to dominate the enclaves where political leaders of Bangladesh acted as patron. If native state and surrounding state have democratic government then problem will solve in democratic way and if authoritative or non democratic government exists there problem will arise in different dimension. Bangladesh and India have solved the issues by democratic way though it has taken huge time. Nature of state should include in the Rashid Gabdulhakov's five steps model. Then this model will be six steps as territory, resources, identity, financial deprivation, concrete legal agreements and nature of state.

## 5.2 Transformation of informal governance to formal governance

As discussed earlier because of absence of state a protection gap has induced and this protection gap leads to induce informal governance in the former enclaves. Informal governance has two distinct characteristics. One is informal institutes play as a functional or problem-solving role where informal rules used to enhance the capability of an institute (Ciorciari, 2013:51). Another strand is about informal institute is, it is dysfunctional and problem creating. Clientelism, clan politics, corruption, patrimonialism are the root cause to undermine the formal governance (Ciorciari, 2013:52). Recent study on informal governance suggests that informal governance may reinforce or substitute the formal governance. (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003).

The typology provided by Helmke and Levitsky (2003), following Lauth, is useful in assessing the relationship between informal and formal institutions in the cases at hand: informal institutions can complement, accommodate, compete with, or substitute for formal ones. This typology, though intended to capture the interaction of institutions in democratizing states, can also be applied to no institutional behavior in any democracies. Most of the cases considered here fall under one column in their typology— ineffective formal institutions.

### 5.2.1 Reasons for transformation of governance:

Informal institute may change because of its failure and formal institute may replace the informal institute. Informal institutions have highly resistant to its change. Formal institutes may change for two regions. Formal institute mainly change to enhance the effectiveness of the formal institute and for change the actor's goal.

If formal institutions induced same outcomes in the presence or absence of informal institution, then there is little need to focus on the formal rules.

Here, formal institutions is FI and informal institution presented by II and outcomes represents by X, then it can be expressed by

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} FI (+ II) = X \\ FI (- II) = X \end{array} \right\} \quad \text{Adapted from Helmke and Levitsky's model}$$

However, if the presence of an informal institution (II) in a particular formal institutional Context (FI) can be shown to produce an outcome (Y) that is distinct from that generated in its absence (X), and then the case for incorporating informal institutions is strengthened. It can be expressed by

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} FI (- II) = X \\ FI (+ II) = Y \end{array} \right\} \text{Adapted from Helmke and Levitsky's model}$$

### 5.2.2 Helmke and Levitsky's four-fold typology to see the transformation process:

Lauth's model of four-fold typology of formal-informal interaction has discussed to see the transformation process. They typology is based on two dimensions. First dimension is the effectiveness of the formal institute where informal institute acts under effective formal institutes in which rules are complied and other is where informal institute acts under weak or ineffective formal institutes in which informal institutes are non compliance.

Second dimension is that of the degree of the compatibility between actor's goal and their demand. Actor's goal mean what type of task they want to perform through particular informal institute and demand means outcomes generated by formal institutions. These two dimensions have produce table -2 shows the four-fold typology based above two dimension of informal institute. In table upper-left and lower-right cells indicate functional and dysfunctional types. Another two dimensions accommodating and substitute; give the accurate picture of the informal institute. First two complementary and competing; supported by most of the literature but four helps us to understand the informal institute completely.

#### A TYPOLOGY OF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS

	<b>Effective Formal Institutions</b>	<b>Ineffective Formal Institutions</b>
<b>Compatible Goals</b>	Complementary	Substitutive
<b>Conflicting Goals</b>	Accommodating	Competing

Table: 2: Four-fold typology (Adapted from Helmke and Levitsky's model)

**Complementary Informal Institutions:**

Informal institute and effective formal institute co-exist with each other on the left side of the table and actors assumed that the existing paper rules will be enforced. Table-2 combines Compatible actor's goals and effective formal institute in the upper left corner, which is called complementary informal institute according to Lauth(1954).

If actor's goal is compatible to the outcome then complementary informal institute address the problems without violating the formal rules. Complementary informal institute enhance the performance the relevant formal institute.

**Accommodating Informal Institutions:**

It is the second best strategy for the informal institutes. if actor's has conflicting goal and combine with the effective informal institute in the lower left corner Table-2, might be called Accommodating informal institutions. In this strategy actors dislike the outcomes of the formal rules but have no ability to change or violate the formal rule (Ciorciari, 2013:59). They accommodating informal institutions don't enhance the efficiency or performance but may enhance the stability of the formal institute.

**Competing Informal Institutions:**

Informal institute and ineffective formal institute co-exist with each other on the right side of the table and actors assumed that the existing paper rules will not be enforced. Table-2, combines Compatible actor's goals and ineffective formal institute in the upper right corner, which creates antagonistic goal and is called competing informal institute according to Lauth(1954). Competing informal institutes are incompatible with the formal rules to follow one rules actors must violate another rule.

If actor's goal is compatible with the outcome then complementary formal institute address the problems without violating the formal rules. Complementary informal institutes enhance the performance the relevant formal institute.

**Substitutive Informal Institutions:**

It is the final strategy for the informal institutes. If actors has conflicting goal and combine with the ineffective formal institute in the lower right corner of table-2, might be called substitutive informal institutions. Because of failure of formal institute, informal institute substitute the formal institute but formal institute should stay there.

Several observations have risen based on this model. Complementary and accommodating informal institutions are suitable for developed countries. Rests two are suitable for developing and post-communist countries (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003). Stable institutes are necessary for the Complementary and accommodating informal institutes that's why it is mostly seen in developing countries. They are also found in the some developing countries (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003). Competing and substitutive informal institutions exist in the weak institutional societies. That's why developing countries find this type of institute.

**5.2.3 Transformation of informal governance in the former enclaves:**

Former enclaves were under informal governance for sixty eight years. A historical swap leads the state to formalize its all illegal and informal procedures. Former enclave dwellers were deprived from all the basic amenities. They had survived for the sixty eight years through illegal ways and by informal governance. Enclave dwellers are now enjoying formal governance. Informal governance is changing its course with the formal governance.

Transformation of governance has observed by a model which is known as fourfold typology and provided by Helmke and Levitsky (2003). According to typology or model informal institutions can complement, accommodate, compete with, or substitute for formal ones. This model is both suitable for developing and developed countries either those countries are democrat or not.

Table-3 has given a simple view of enclaves about the changes from informal governance to formal governance. This table gives the formal achievement from the informal lives and in

later part this research has analyzed about the transformation process based on four-fold model

Features	Informal lives	Formal lives
Citizenship	Proxy Citizenship or Meaningless Citizenship	Real Citizenship
Identity	No identity	Identity
Voting Power	No Voting Power	Voting Power
Women Empowerment	No Women Empowerment	Women Empowerment
Rule of Law	No Rule of Law	Rule of Law
Might is Right	Might is Right	Lawfully not possible
False or illegal activities	False or illegal activities	No false or illegal activities
Fundamental needs (Health, education, food, shelter)	No fundamental needs	Ensure by state
Economical Activities	Illegal economic activities and less	Legal economic activities and enhanced
Job	No Job	Opportunity has created
Land management	Informal way	Formal way
Patron-client relation	Through informal system	Through formal systems
Social lives (Arbitration, marriage registration)	No or through informal systems	Yes and by formal systems

Table: 3: Achievement from informal governance to formal governance.

Now this section will discuss about the transformation process based on fourfold typology. In this typology informal institutions may interact with formal institute by four ways that is complementary, accommodating, substitutive and competing.

**Complimentary informal institutions:** If actor's goal is compatible to the outcome then complementary informal institute address the problems without violating the formal rules. Complementary informal institute enhance the performance the relevant formal institute. Existing paper rules will be enforced in the complementary informal institutions.

From the above table -3, it has found that during the transformation process while informal governance is changing to formal governance is compatible to actor's goal and the presence and absence of informal institute with formal institute give two outcomes "X" and "Y". The case for incorporating informal institutions is strengthened. It can be expressed by

$$FI (- II) = X$$

$$FI (+ II) = Y$$



That means presence of informal governance has strengthened the outcomes of formal institutes. It is similar to complimentary informal institutes. Transformation processes in the former enclaves shows that actor's goal is compatible with the formal institutions. That is citizenship, identity, voting power, women empowerment, state provided fundamental services, creating of job opportunity, rule of law, proper land management all are actor's compatible goals.

Bangladesh has effective formal institutions compare to informal institutions. Actor's assumed to enforce the existing paper rules. In these cases informal institutions will interact with formal institutions through complementary way. Complementary informal institute address the problems without violating the formal rules. Complementary informal institute enhance the performance the relevant formal institute. Some examples are given bellow which has shown that government has kept informal or illegal things to strength the formalization process.

**Inspiration for the education through job replacements; Kept antecedent informal way of education:**

Former dwellers of enclave were deprived from all level of education. Scenarios of education have changed by the swap. Dwellers are getting the opportunity to all level of education through formal governance.

In case of education, false addresses still remain. Dwellers, who admitted in the school of Bangladeshi territories by using false addresses, remain the same false addresses after the swap. If government wants to change the addresses, dwellers have to face difficulties to change the addresses rather keep the previous addresses

**Job has offered through formal governance by keeping the previous procedure:**

Bangladesh government has arranged special recruitment for the former enclave inhabitants in the forces. By this special arrangement dwellers have joined the government

jobs those studied by using false addresses. But according to our law, if anyone has false addresses, are not capable to join the government services. By using the false address to join in forces, is unbelievable as a Bangladeshi citizen. For dwellers, they have joined in government jobs and in various forces. For them, formal governance is compromising with illegal thing which was an outcome informal system for absence of formal governance and acting in accommodative way with the informal governance.

#### **Land formalization by the help of previous informal mechanisms:**

Informal documents and mutual understanding has taken into consideration to formalize the land. After the survey, government has given fifteen days to settle the disputable issues with the *Upazilla* committee. If anyone has objection, he has alleged to this committee within fifteen days. This committee has tried to solve the issues by mutual understandings or advised them to solve it outside the office based on their available informal documents. If appellor does not satisfied, he has chance to appeal to the deputy commissioner (DC). Most of the cases all the committees have tried to solve the issues by mutual understandings. Since dwellers have expertise on informal mechanisms, so government also encourages them to solve by informal way. Government has delivered the aid to the enclave dwellers through *Chit* chairmen and members of the former enclaves after the historical exchange. This involvement proved some legality of informal governance by formal governance.

#### **5.3 Beneficiaries:**

Two types of gain have identified in this research; Tangible gain and intangible gain. All the former enclave dwellers have achieved both tangible gain and intangible gain. Dwellers have achieved less authority over tangible gain. Patron-client relationship has a momentous role over tangible gain. Patron and client who are loyal to patron have achieved more tangible benefit in compare to other dwellers. Patron-client relationships have no effect over intangible gain. Though all are getting both types of benefit (tangible and intangible) but all are showing more or less dissatisfaction. Dwellers have not shown any dissatisfaction over intangible gain but dissatisfaction has risen for tangible gain.

Clientelism has intensive role in Bangladesh. Clientelism has an effect in Bangladesh to get any benefit from the government. Loyalty is very important in the clientelism. Patron and loyal client get more benefit in Bangladesh. Tangible gain is touchable and is influenced by patron-client relationship. Clientelism and patron-client relationship have an impact on benefit in formal governance.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Conclusion**

Informal governances and illegal activities were playing the key role in the enclaves for the last sixty years. After implementation of historical swap by two governments, enclave dwellers enter into the era of formal governance. Informal governance has changed its socio-political characteristics with touch of formal governance. There are no more existences of informal governance in the former enclaves; formal governance has replaced the informal governance. In order to survive, enclave inhabitants were involved in the illegal activities because there was absence of formal governance. After the swap, inhabitants do not need to involve in illegal activities because state will ensure their basic needs.

In their previous lives, inhabitants were relied upon informal governance. Patron-client relationship played the vital role in the enclaves. Informal governance was influenced by patron-client retaliation. Those had good relation with the influential person especially outside the enclaves, got privilege. They were deprived from all the basic needs, so, in order to fulfill their basic demands they had to rely on Bangladesh. They were not allowed to enter the Bangladesh legally so they had to do illegal affords to fulfill their demands. To avail their fundamental demands such as education, health had to use fake addresses. To enter into the school they had to use false addresses. False addresses were common phenomena in the enclaves. To get any medical facilities they had to use false addresses.

Violence's were the common in the enclaves. Because of judicial complication administrative personnel were not allowed to enter the enclave. As a result enclaves were the safe haven for the criminal. Because of violence Passer by become fare to pass the enclaves. Absence of judicial organ; made informal governance strong. Geo graphical proximity and patron client relation had influenced to the informal governance. Because of absence of state, Bangladeshi people; dominate the enclave both positive and negative way. Bangladeshi criminal bound the hapless dwellers to shelter them unless they had to harass.

Formation of informal governance had a similarity with union council of Bangladesh. They had introduced; election commission and care taker government, which was very similar to Bangladesh. Not only formations of informal mechanisms but also Bangladeshi citizens were involved in the process of informal governance. Most of chit chairmen and members had dual citizenship and they had close relation with Bangladeshi political leaders. Sometimes hapless dweller made; good relation and patron client relationship in order to ensure their fundamental needs or to get extra privilege.

Enclaves had lack of resources and geo graphical locations were not suitable in terms of politics and economics. This was the reason for absence of native state. Absence of state creates an environment to formulate the informal mechanisms. Absence of state create protection gap as result informal governance gets a platform to flourish over there. Absence of native state also gives a window for other state to dominate over there. India had given the window to dominate their land by Bangladesh. Absence of government created this type of opportunity.

Absence of state had created Bangladesh more powerful state than India but India is a big country compares to Bangladesh. Bangladeshi territory had induced buffer area and created protection gap inside the enclave. This protection gap had created patron-client relationship between two countries Bangladesh and India where Bangladesh was patron and India acted as client. This patron-client relationship was the only solution to survive through illegal and informal way. Enclave dwellers were relied upon on Bangladesh for education, health, social lives etc. Bangladeshi political masters also played the role in their informal governance.

After the exchange informal governance has replaced by formal governance; depending on the situation informal governance is changing its course either it is complementary or competitive. If actor's goal is compatible to the outcome then complementary formal institute address the problems without violating the formal rules. Complementary informal institute enhance the performance the relevant formal institute. Bangladesh has effective formal institutions compare to informal institutions. Actor's assumed to enforce the existing paper rules. In these cases informal institutions will interact with formal institutions through

complementary way. Complementary informal institute has addressed the problems of former enclaves without violating the formal rules. Complementary informal institute enhance the performance the relevant formal institute by keeping the existing formal rules.

Informal documents and mutual understanding has taken into consideration to formalize the land. After the survey, government has given fifteen days to settle the disputable issues with the *Upazilla* committee. If anyone has objection, he has alleged to this committee within fifteen days. This committee has tried to solve the issues by mutual understandings or advised them to solve it outside the office based on their available informal documents. If appellor does not satisfied, he has chance to appeal to the deputy commissioner (DC). Most of the cases all the committees have tried to solve the issues by mutual understandings. Dwellers have expertise on informal mechanisms, so government also encourages them to solve the problems.

Two types of gain have identified in this research; Tangible gain and intangible gain. All the former enclave dwellers have achieved both tangible gain and intangible gain. Dwellers have achieved less authority over tangible gain. Patron-client relationship has a momentous role over tangible gain. Patron and client who are loyal to patron have achieved more tangible benefit in compare to other dwellers.

Absence of state had caused serious suffering for enclave dwellers for the past sixty eight years. State has emerged in their existence by the historical swap. Now the informal governance is playing the complementary role with formal governance and former residents of enclaves are getting benefit of this. Further study may be done to see the satisfaction of dwellers though they did not choose their native land and their native land is the big force compare to Bangladesh. Another further study may be done to see how formal institute will impact on patron client relationship and a comparative study of patron client relationship between their informal lives and formal lives.

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## Appendix-1

### Specific research question No: 1

#### ***What were the features of informal governance in enclave?***

#### Interview guide for Enclave dwellers:

1. How are you? (If answer is negative, then ask the reason behind these)
2. Now you are citizen of country, is it anything special for you?
  - a. If yes,
    - i. Why it is special?
    - ii. Is it special for all the enclave dwellers?
    - iii. Have you find out any difference from the former enclave life?
  - b. If not,
    - i. Is it true for all the dwellers or part of the dwellers
    - ii. Why did you want this right?
    - iii. Why Nagarik committee did lead for citizenship?  
(For committee member's interest/ for minority interest/ Influence by other)
  - c. You have a choice to select any country,
    - i. Why you choose Bangladesh as your homeland?
    - ii. Do you know the reason, for being Indian citizen, by some enclave dwellers?
    - iii. Is there any minority person, who did not migrate (Reason)?
3. After the exchange, you have observed some festivals (like Eid, Boysakh, Puza), is it in new dimension or same as the past?
4. Are you married? (If yes)
  - i. Who are your husband/ wife?
  - ii. Was he/ she citizen of former enclave?If partner was not the former enclave dwellers, then
  - i. How did you get married?
  - ii. Why did you get married?
5. Have you any children? (If yes)
  - i. Did he /she go to school (How you arranged it?)

- ii. If answer is he used the false identity, then,
    - a. Have you changed the false identity?
    - b. How you change the false identity?
- 6. Occupation
  - i. What is your present occupation?
  - ii. What were the occupations of people in former enclave?
  - iii. In what types of occupations peoples are involving now?
  - iv. Have your income increased?
- 7. Have you any land property?
  - a. If no,
    - i. Had you cultivated as “Adhiar”?
    - ii. Where you stayed?
    - iii. Was land lord the legal authoritarian of this occupied land?
      - A. If no, then
        - 1. Was he inside the enclave?
        - 2. Was he outside the enclave?
        - 3. How they did it? (Influenced by Nagrik committee/ influenced by outside political master )
  - b. If yes,
    - i. Have you proper documents?
    - ii. If yes, how you managed it?
    - iii. If not, then how you will manage it?
    - iv. Is it creating new tension in this region?
- 8. In past many things was informal, now it is formal, what are you feeling. Give any experience

**Specific research question No: 2**

***How informal governance is changing its socio-political nature when it comes close to the formal governance?***

**Interview guide for Enclave dwellers:**

- 1. Are you married? (If yes)
  - i. Who are your husband/ wife?

ii. Was he/ she citizen of former enclave?

If partner was not the former enclave dwellers, then

i. How did you get married?

ii. Why did you get married?

2. Have you any children? (If yes)

i. Did he /she go to school (How you arranged it?)

ii. If answer is he used the false identity, then,

a. Have you changed the false identity?

b. How you change the false identity?

3. Occupation

i. What is your present occupation?

ii. What were the occupations of people in former enclave?

iii. In what types of occupations peoples are involving now?

iv. Have your income increased?

4. Have you any land property?

a. If no,

i. Had you cultivated as “Adhiar”?

ii. Where you stayed?

iii. Was land lord the legal authoritarian of this occupied land?

A. If no, then

1. Was he inside the enclave?

2. Was he outside the enclave?

3. How they did it? (Influenced by Nagrik committee/ influenced by outside political master )

b. If yes,

i. Have you proper documents?

ii. If yes, how you managed it?

iii. If not, then how you will manage it?

iv. Is land issue creating new tension in this region?

#### Interview guide for local Thana

5. Have crime increased or decreased?

6. Pattern of increase or decrease.
7. How you are solving the past crime, those were recorded in India?
8. Is there are any unwanted or illegal involvements in the land issues?

Interview guide for local administration

1. What is the pattern of land problem?
2. Is it creating new tension in this region?
3. What types of initiatives government has taken to solve the land problems?
4. Are victims satisfied?
5. Is there are any unwanted or illegal involvements in the land issues?

**Specific research question No: 3**

***How formal governance is solving the land disputes?***

Interview guide for Enclave dwellers:

1. Have you any land property?
  - a. If yes,
    - i. Have you proper documents?
    - ii. If yes, how you managed it?
    - iii. If not, then how you will manage it?
    - iv. Is land issue creating new tension in this region?
    - v. Is there are any unwanted or illegal involvements in the land issues?
    - vi. Are you happy of government initiatives regarding land disputes?

Interview guide for local administration

1. What is the pattern of land problem?
2. Is it creating new tension in this region?
3. What types of initiatives government has taken to solve the land problems?
4. Are victims satisfied?
5. Is there are any unwanted or illegal involvements in the land issues?

Interview guide for local Thana

1. Have crime increased or decreased?
2. Pattern of increase or decrease.
3. How you are solving the past crime, those were recorded in India?
4. Is there are any unwanted or illegal involvements in the land issues?

**Specific research question No: 4**

***Who are the beneficiaries after this exchange?***

Analysis the above question and case studies to identify the beneficiaries

## Appendix-2




Figure-1: Documents of land possession by paying taxes to the Maharajah's estate from Bengali year 1355-1358. Source: Collected from former enclave Behuladanga.




Fig 2: Land documents of Cooch Bihar known as "Terij", Source: Collected from *Behuladanga*






Fig 3: Map of Cooch Bihar district marking the enclaves. Source: Collected by field visit






Fig 4: Ancient land documents of enclave. Source: Collected by field visit




Fig 4: Ancient land documents of enclave. Source: Collected by field visit

### Appendix-3

#### Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh

Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh																								
CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Chang es [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Mal e	Fe mal e	Tot al	To tal HH	Bir th	Marr iage	Oth ers	Tot al	Dea th	Out- migr ation	Oth ers	Tot al		Tot al HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Mal e	Fem ale	Total	Mal e	Fem ale	Tot al	Mal e	Fem ale	Tota l
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Country : Bangladesh Zila: Panchagarh Upazila : Panchagarh Sadar																								
Garati	0075	66	67	133	31	18	10	0	28	2	7		9	19	31	71	81	152			0	71	81	152
Garati	0076	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Garati	0077	41	40	81	19	4	3	0	7	2	5		7	0	19	41	40	81			0	41	40	81
Garati	0078	824	759	1583	344	125	61	0	186	13	66	1	80	106	344	882	807	1689	2	2	4	880	805	1685
Garati	0079	2	4	6	1	1	0	0	1	0	1		1	0	1	3	3	6			0	3	3	6
Garati	0080	63	59	122	27	13	5	0	18	2	5		7	11	27	65	68	133			0	65	68	133
Singimari Part I	0073	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Country : Bangladesh Zila: Panchagarh Upazila : Boda																								
Nazirganja	0041	361	295	656	151	56	9	0	65	6	35		41	24	151	381	299	680	9	5	14	372	294	666
Nazirganja	0042	230	219	449	108	30	11	0	41	7	20		27	14	108	238	225	463	11	9	20	227	216	443
Nazirganja	0044	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0045	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0046	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0047	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0048	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0

### Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh

Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh																								
CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Changes [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Male	Female	Total	Total HH	Birth	Marriage	Others	Total	Death	Out-migration	Others	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Nazirganja	0049	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0050	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0051	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0052	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0053	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0054	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0055	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0056	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0057	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0058	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Nazirganja	0060	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Putimari	0059	182	176	358	78	35	18	0	53	5	18		23	30	78	197	191	388			0	197	191	388
Daikhata Chhat	0038	289	245	534	117	41	16	0	57	12	21		33	24	117	291	267	558	11	7	18	280	260	540
Salbari	0037	673	652	1325	285	129	38	0	167	16	108	18	142	25	295	675	675	1350			0	675	675	1350
Country : Bangladesh    Zila: Panchagarh    Upazila : Debiganj																								
Kajal Dighi	0036	802	749	1551	309	142	50	0	192	18	36		54	138	309	847	842	1689	2	1	3	845	841	1686
Natakotha	0032	67	51	118	24	3	0	0	3	2	6		8	-5	24	67	46	113	6	1	7	61	45	106
Natakotha	0033	39	38	77	15	6	2	0	8	0	1		1	7	15	41	43	84			0	41	43	84

**Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh**

CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Changes [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Male	Female	Total	Total HH	Birth	Marriage	Others	Total	Death	Out-migration	Others	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Beuladanga Chhat	0035	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Beuladanga	0034	948	874	1822	360	99	44	0	143	10	24		34	109	360	996	935	1931	4	3	7	992	932	1924
Balapara Khagrabari	0003	1493	1394	2887	563	250	101	0	351	25	99	5	129	222	563	1593	1516	3109	3	2	5	1590	1514	3104
Kotbhajni	0002	1927	1765	3692	687	281	108	0	389	44	126	2	172	217	687	2032	1877	3909	85	86	171	1947	1791	3738
Dahala Khagrabari fragment	0001	1784	1623	3407	703	246	95	0	341	38	202	30	270	71	703	1818	1660	3478	122	116	238	1696	1544	3240
Country : Bangladesh    Zila: Nilphamari    Upazila : Dimla																								
Bara Khankikharija Gitaldaha	0030	19	18	37	8	4	2	0	6	0	0		0	6	8	23	20	43			0	23	20	43
Bara Khankikharija Gitaldaha	0029	91	95	186	45	15	3	0	18	4	5		9	9	45	97	98	195	0	0	0	97	98	195
Barakhangir	0028	43	43	86	21	8	3	0	11	2	7		9	2	21	45	43	88	0	0	0	45	43	88
Nagarjikabari	0031	104	93	197	45	22	5	2	29	2	3		5	24	45	116	105	221	0	0	0	116	105	221
Country : Bangladesh    Zila: Lalmonirhat    Upazila : Patgram																								
Andhogram	0026	20	19	39	10	4	0	0	4	0	1		1	3	10	21	21	42			0	21	21	42
Andhogram	0027	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Barakuchlibari fragment	0107	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Fulkadaburi	0006	4	3	7	2	0	0	0	0	0	1		1	-1	2	4	2	6			0	4	2	6

**Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh**

CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Changes [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Male	Female	Total	Total HH	Birth	Marriage	Others	Total	Death	Out-migration	Others	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Uponchowki Kuchlibari	115A	0	0	0	0			0	0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Barakhangir	0007	65	62	127	29	5	1	0	6	1	4		5	1	29	67	61	128			0	67	61	128
Bhotbari	0008	41	41	82	15	11	4	0	15	0	2		2	13	15	47	48	95			0	47	48	95
Balapukhari	0005	107	104	211	52	24	8	0	32	4	12		16	16	52	118	109	227			0	118	109	227
Bara Khangir	0004	65	63	128	28	5	1	0	6	1	11		12	-6	28	65	57	122			0	65	57	122
Bara Khangir	0009	176	150	326	72	23	19	0	42	8	13		21	21	72	175	172	347			0	175	172	347
Chat Baghdakia	0010	47	51	98	20	5	0		5	2	3		5	0	20	47	51	98			0	47	51	98
Ratanpur	0011	44	47	91	18	7	4		11	2	3		5	6	19	45	52	97	0		0	45	52	97
Bagdogra	0012	18	21	39	11	4	2		6	0	1		1	5	11	19	25	44			0	19	25	44
Fulker Dabri fragnment	0101	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Kharkharia	0015	74	62	136	29	13	9		22	1	4		5	17	29	81	72	153	1	0	1	80	72	152
Kharkharia	0013	99	106	205	47	14	4		18	2	10		12	6	47	102	109	211			0	102	109	211
Lotamari	0014	222	212	434	98	36	9		45	10	21		31	14	101	225	223	448	2	1	3	223	222	445
Bhotbari	0016	337	302	639	127	52	20		72	5	23		28	44	127	374	309	683			0	374	309	683
Kamat Changrabandha	016A	59	44	103	19	7	3		10	2	5		7	3	19	60	46	106			0	60	46	106
Kamat Changrabandha	017A	24	22	46	9	3	1		4	0	1		1	3	9	26	23	49			0	26	23	49

**Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh**

CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Changes [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Male	Female	Total	Total HH	Birth	Marriage	Others	Total	Death	Out-migration	Others	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Panisala	0017	172	158	330	58	24	10		34	4	8		12	22	58	187	165	352			0	187	165	352
Dwarikamari Khasbash	0018	88	78	166	38	13	5		18	3	3		6	12	38	90	88	178			0	90	88	178
Panisala	153P	28	34	62	14	5	0	0	5	0	2		2	3	14	32	33	65			0	32	33	65
Panisala	153O	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Panisala	0019	88	85	173	37	15	5		20	3	1		4	16	43	94	95	189			0	94	95	189
Panisala	0021	68	50	118	26	12	5		17	1	3		4	13	26	72	59	131			0	72	59	131
Lotamari	0020	327	274	601	118	52	28		80	7	16		23	57	118	353	305	658			0	353	305	658
Lotamari	0022	197	143	340	69	33	24		57	5	9		14	43	69	204	179	383			0	204	179	383
Dwarikamari	0023	65	62	127	25	5	4		9	3	6		9	0	25	62	65	127			0	62	65	127
Dwarikamari	0025	97	90	187	38	12	5	0	17	1	11		12	5	38	94	98	192			0	94	98	192
Chat Bhotbat	0024	98	94	192	43	13	8	0	21	1	8		9	12	43	104	100	204			0	104	100	204
Chenakata	0134	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0131	66	61	127	22	13	4	0	17	2	5		7	10	22	67	70	137			0	67	70	137
Baskata	0132	25	18	43	10	13	6	0	19	0	0		0	19	10	33	29	62			0	33	29	62
Baskata 1	0130	48	50	98	19	5	2	0	7	1	3		4	3	19	51	50	101			0	51	50	101
Bhogramguri	0133	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Banskata	0119	687	713	1400	294	143	58	0	201	11	61		72	129	283	749	780	1529	49	50	99	700	730	1430
Banskata	0120	37	38	75	18	6	1	0	7	2	6		8	-1	18	39	35	74			0	39	35	74

### Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh

Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh																								
CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Changes [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Male	Female	Total	Total HH	Birth	Marriage	Others	Total	Death	Out-migration	Others	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Banskata	0121	0	0	0	0																0	0	0	0
Mominpur	0113	63	71	134	28	16	3	0	19	4	9		13	6	32	66	74	140			0	66	74	140
Baskata	0112	356	308	664	152	19	12	0	31	6	16		22	9	152	360	313	673	3	3	6	357	310	667
Baskata	0114	0	0	0	0																0	0	0	0
Baskata	0115	17	15	32	8	6	1	0	7	0	0		0	7	8	19	20	39	10	14	24	9	6	15
Baskata	0122	32	33	65	13	4	2	0	6	2	0		2	4	13	35	34	69			0	35	34	69
Baskata	0127	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0128	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0117	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0118	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0125	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0126	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0129	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0116	97	90	187	41	10	3	0	13	1	1		2	11	41	103	95	198			0	103	95	198
Baskata	0123	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Baskata	0124	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Asokbari	0157	0	0	0	0				0				0	0				0			0	0	0	0
Country : Bangladesh    Zila: Lalmonirhat    Upazila : Hatibhanda																								
Gotamari Chhit	0135	245	244	489	11	30	10	2	42	6	26	2	34	8	11	250	247	497	16	18	34	234	229	463



### Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh

Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh																								
CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Changes [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Male	Female	Total	Total HH	Birth	Marriage	Others	Total	Death	Out-migration	Others	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
					1										1									
Gotamari Chhit	0136	21	13	34	9	4	3	0	7	1	0		1	6	6	21	19	40	16	12	28	5	7	12
Country : Bangladesh    Zila: Lalmonirhat    Upazila : Lalmonirhat Sadar																								
Banspachai	0151	333	349	682	142	53	0	0	53	12	25		37	16	142	354	344	698			0	354	344	698
Banspachai Bhitarkuthi	0152	315	318	633	154	42	0	0	42	10	15		25	17	154	327	323	650			0	327	323	650
Country : Bangladesh    Zila: Kurigram    Upazila : Fulbari																								
Dasiar Chara	0150	3756	3402	7167	1369	410	162	0	572	88	352		440	132	1397	3780	3519	7299	144	137	281	3636	3382	7018
Country : Bangladesh    Zila: Kurigram    Upazila : Bhurungamari																								
Dakurhat-Dakinirhat	0156	0	0	0	0																0	0	0	0
Kalamati	0141	49	50	99	23	8	4	0	12	2	6		8	4	23	50	53	103			0	50	53	103
Shahebganj	0153	79	69	148	32	18	3	0	21	2	2		4	17	32	89	76	165			0	89	76	165
Seotikursa	0142	116	112	228	52	18	6	0	24	5	7		12	12	53	120	120	240			0	120	120	240
Bara Goachulka	0143	48	43	91	24	9	5	0	14	1	3		4	10	25	54	47	101			0	54	47	101
Goachulka II	0147	3	6	9	3	1	0	0	1	0	1		1	0	3	4	5	9			0	4	5	9
Goachulka I	0146	59	43	102	24	6	7	0	13	1	3		4	9	24	64	47	111			0	64	47	111
Dighaltari II	0145	22	20	42	8	3	1	0	4	0	2		2	2	8	22	22	44			0	22	22	44

**Final Compilation report of Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh**

CHHIT Name	CHHIT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By				Exclusion By				Changes [ +/ - ]				Country Opted for						
		Male	Female	Total	Total HH	Birth	Marriage	Others	Total	Death	Out-migration	Others	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA			BANGLADESH		
																Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Dighaltari I	0144	64	46	110	24	15	5	0	20	0	0		0	20	24	71	59	130			0	71	59	130
Choto Garaljhora II	0149	72	75	147	35	6	1	0	7	0	5		5	2	35	75	74	149	14	10	24	61	64	125
Choto Garaljhora II	0148	98	95	193	39	7	1	0	8	5	5		10	-2		97	94	191			0	97	94	191
Total		19386	17918	37313	7647	2790	1063	4	3857	438	1530		2026	1831	7648	20187	18957	39144	510	477	987	19677	18480	38157

#### Appendix-4

##### Final Compilation report of Bangladeshi Enclaves in INDIA

Final Compilation report of Bangladeshi Enclaves in INDIA																			
CHHIT Name	CHH IT No	As Per 2011 Survey				Inclusion By			Exclusion By			Chang es [ +/ -]				Country Opted for			
		Mal e	Fema le	Tota l	Total HH	Birt h	Marria ge	Tot al	Deat h	Out- migratio n	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA		
														Male	Femal e	Total	Mal e	Fema le	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Country : India    Zila: Coochbehar																			
Chit Kutchlibari	002 2	135	125	260	57	15	3	18	2	5	7	11	57	140	131	271	140	131	271
Chhitland of Kutchilibari	002 4	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Balapukhari	002 1	137	137	274	61	16	7	23	5	3	8	15	61	142	147	289	142	147	289
Chhitland of Panbari No.2	002 0	0	0	0	0			0	0		0	0				0	0	0	0
Chhit Panbari	001 8	6	7	13	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	7	7	14	7	7	14
Dhabalsati Mirgipur	001 5	80	82	162	38	13	4	17	5	9	14	3	38	79	86	165	79	86	165
Bamandal	001 1	0	0	0	0			0			0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
Chhit Dhabalbasti	001 4	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Dhabalsati	001 3	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Srirampur	000 8	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Jote Nijjama	003 A	86	65	151	40	9	3	12	2	2	4	8	40	87	72	159	87	72	159

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		Mal e	Fema le	Tota l	Total HH	Birt h	Marria ge	Tot al	Deat h	Out- migratio n	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA		
														Male	Femal e	Total	Mal e	Fema le	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Chhitland of Jagatber No.3	0037	85	97	182	39	15	6	21	5	6	11	10	48	89	103	192	89	103	192
Chhitland of Jagatber No.1	0035	15	18	33	9	3	1	4	0	2	2	2	11	17	18	35	17	18	35
Chhitland of Jagatber No.2	0036	17	16	33	9	3	2	5	1	2	3	2	9	17	18	35	17	18	35
Chhit Kokoabari	0047	30	35	65	16	0	0	0	0	2	2	-2	16	30	33	63	30	33	63
Chhit Bhandardaha	0067	21	22	43	10	5	3	8	2	0	2	6	10	22	27	49	22	27	49
Dhabalguri	0052	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Chhitland of Dhabalguri No. 3	0053	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Chhitland of Dhabalguri No. 4	0070	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Chhitland of Dhabalguri No. 5	0071	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Chhitland of Dhabalguri No. 6	0072	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Chhitland of Dhabalguri No. 1	0068	12	14	26	6	4	1	5	0	0	0	5	8	14	17	31	14	17	31
Chhitland of Dhabalguri No. 2	0069	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Mahishmari	0054	121	105	226	48	18	11	29	7	6	13	16	48	128	114	242	128	114	242

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														Male	Femal e	Total	Mal e	Fema le	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Falnapur	006 4	322	271	593	137	44	20	64	18	15	33	31	152	337	287	624	337	287	624
Nalgram Fragment	006 5	796	742	153 8	305	116	47	163	26	46	72	91	314	837	792	1629	837	792	1629
Chhit Nalgram Fragment	006 6	82	90	172	36	14	5	19	1	5	6	13	36	86	99	185	86	99	185
Bura Saradubi	001 3	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Amjhol	005 7	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Kismat Batrigatchi	008 2	323	281	604	125	49	20	69	15	18	33	36	129	336	304	640	336	304	640
Durgapur	008 3	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Batrigatchi fragment	008 1	775	725	150 0	239	190	57	247	31	42	73	174	238	859	815	1674	859	815	1674
Bansua Khamar Citaldaha	000 1	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Poaturkuthi	037 A	1291	1211	250 2	483	237	112	349	34	88	122	227	479	1354	1375	2729	135 4	1375	2729
Pashchim Bakalir Chhara	003 8	409	371	780	172	54	15	69	18	65	83	-14	166	389	377	766	389	377	766
Madhya Bakalir Chhara	003 9	87	77	164	37	24	9	33	6	12	18	15	36	89	90	179	89	90	179
Purba Bakalir Chara	004 0	37	23	60	11	6	7	13	1	4	5	8	11	34	34	68	34	34	68

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														Male	Femal e	Total	Mal e	Fema le	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Madhya Masaldanga	000 3	203	210	413	90	34	14	48	10	26	36	12	128	214	211	425	214	211	425
Madhya Chhit Masaldanga	000 8	10	13	23	7	2	1	3	0	0	0	3	7	12	14	26	12	14	26
Paschim Chhit Masaldanga	000 7	17	12	29	5	1	1	2	0	0	0	2	5	17	14	31	17	14	31
Uttar Masaldanga	000 2	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Kachua	000 5	235	234	469	84	38	15	53	10	26	36	17	86	237	249	486	237	249	486
Dakshin Masaldanga fragment	000 6	864	815	167 9	321	120	76	196	32	89	121	75	322	869	885	1754	869	885	1754
Paschim Masaldanga fragment	000 4	67	76	143	29	15	4	19	1	6	7	12	29	71	84	155	71	84	155
Purba Chhit Masaldanga fragment	001 0	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Purba Masaldanga fragment	001 1	178	159	337	80	29	12	41	7	10	17	24	80	185	176	361	185	176	361
Karala fragment	000 9	634	591	122 5	242	86	5	91	15	56	71	20	242	639	606	1245	639	606	1245
Sibprasad Mustafi fragment	008 A	166	141	307	70	30	12	42	5	13	18	24	68	171	160	331	171	160	331
Uttar Bansjani	000 1	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Chhat Tilai	001 7	5	10	15	4	0	0	0	2	2	4	-4	3	5	6	11	5	6	11

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		Mal e	Fema le	Tota l	Total HH	Birt h	Marria ge	Tot al	Deat h	Out- migratio n	Total		Total HH	Members			INDIA		
														Male	Femal e	Total	Mal e	Fema le	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Uttar Masaldanga fragment	0014	0	0	0	0			0			0	0				0	0	0	0
Total		7246	6775	### #	1336	1191	473	###	261	560	821	843	2879	7513	7351	14864	7513	7351	14864

